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INTRODUCTION

Corporate directors cannot afford to remain ignorant of human
trafficking violations in corporate supply chains.' Corporations in the
United States that benefit from supply-chain trafficking have been able
to escape liability when the trafficking occurs in the labor force of their
suppliers instead of the labor force of the corporation itself.2 However,
the 2008 reauthorization of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
specifically targets this behavior under its criminal and civil provisions
regarding financial benefit from labor trafficking. 3 Corporations with
trafficking violations in their supply chains risk criminal prosecution
and civil suits filed by foreign and domestic victims, and the directors
of such corporations risk shareholder derivative suits for failure to
perform fiduciary duties.
Corporations discussed in this Note are United States-based
corporations whose supply chains include foreign suppliers,
manufacturers, distributors, security forces, subsidiaries, and other
parties (collectively, "suppliers"). These suppliers are separate legal
entities but may be crucial to the business operations of the
corporations. This Note analyzes the legal obligations under the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of these multinational corporations

Corporate Liability and Human Trafficking, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 1 (Dec. 2015),
1.
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRFCorporateLiabilityTraffickingreport.pdf
[perma.cc/CX88-MD4A] ("Civil society and victims' rights groups are [ ] finding new ways to hold
accountable not only the perpetrators, but the beneficiaries of [forced labor], increasingly targeting
supply chains .... ").
See Naomi Jiyoung Bang, Unmasking the Charadeof the Global Supply Contract:A Novel
2.
Theory of Corporate Liability in Human Trafficking and Forced Labor Cases, 35 HOUS. J. INT'L L.
255, 257-58 (2013) (explaining that corporations have not been held accountable for supply-chain
trafficking).
The TVPRA has had four separate reauthorizations since it was passed-in 2003, 2005,
3.
2008, and 2013. Current Federal Laws, POLARIS PROJECT, http://www.polarisproject.org/ currentfederal-laws (last visited Jan. 24, 2016) [perma.cc/R3AY-3A74].
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and their directors when there is labor trafficking in the workforce of
4
the supplier but not the corporation.
Prior to initial passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
in 2000, no domestic legal regime was well suited to criminalize and
create liability for labor trafficking occurring abroad or to hold
multinational corporations accountable if they benefitted from, but did
not directly commit, human rights violations. 5 This status quo fails
because corporations that benefit from human trafficking violations
lack financial incentives to monitor their supply chains to avoid this
wrongful benefit. In 2000, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
became the first law to fill the legislative gap and attempt to
comprehensively address human trafficking. 6 The Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000 and its four subsequent reauthorizations
("TVPRA") criminalize a broader range of trafficking-related activities
7
than other existing laws.
Congress intended the TVPRA to fill the gaps left by previous
laws to more effectively deter and punish traffickers for their crimes
both domestically and abroad.8 In 2003, legislators added a civil cause

See generally SURYA DEVA, REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS:
4.
HUMANIZING BUSINESS 21 (2012) (describing a multinational corporation as one that "operate[s]

in more than one country, including by owning, managing[,] or controlling other corporations as
well as acting, in part, through suppliers and contractors"). This Note will not address whether a
U.S. corporation and its directors should be held morally responsible to foreign plaintiffs for
trafficking violations under notions of corporate social responsibility, but rather whether a U.S.
corporation and its directors are legally responsible to foreign trafficking victims and domestic
shareholders when an entity in its supply chain commits trafficking violations. For a discussion of
U.S. laws in addition to the TVPRA that could apply to corporate supply chains, see Corporate
Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 2-18.
See Bang, supra note 2, at 257-58 (noting corporations' ability to avoid accountability for
5.
trafficking); Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of Action:
Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 4 (2004)
(explaining the problem of applying other laws to trafficking offenses).
H.R. Rep. 106-939, at 5 (2000) (Conf. Rep.). In 2000, President Bill Clinton said that the
6.
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000 "creates a new 'forced labor' felony
criminal offense that will provide Federal prosecutors with the tools needed to prosecute the
sophisticated forms of nonphysical coercion that traffickers use today to exploit their victims."
President William J. Clinton, Statement by the President on HR 3244 (Oct. 30, 2000), 2000 WL
1617225.
7.
H.R. Rep. 106-939, at 1 (2000) (Conf. Rep.); Current Federal Laws, supra note 3.
8.
H.R. Rep. 106-939, at 5 (2000) (Conf. Rep.):
Existing legislation and law enforcement in the United States and other countries are
inadequate to deter trafficking and bring traffickers to justice, failing to reflect the
gravity of the offenses involved. No comprehensive law exists in the United States that
penalizes the range of offenses involved in the trafficking scheme. Instead, even the
most brutal instances of trafficking in the sex industry are often punished under laws
that also apply to lesser offenses, so that traffickers typically escape deserved
punishment.
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of action to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. 9 In the 2008
reauthorization ("2008 TVPRA"), they expanded the language of the Act
to include criminal and civil penalties for any person who "knowingly
benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from
participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or
obtaining of labor or services" by means of force, threats, or abuse when
the party knew or recklessly disregarded how the labor was obtained.10
The 2008 TVPRA also expanded courts' jurisdiction over violations of
the Act.1 1
Since the 2008 TVPRA, a corporation can be held directly liable
for financial benefit accrued from business associations where the
corporation knew or was in reckless disregard of the fact that the other
party employed 2 trafficked labor. 13 The TVPRA applies to corporations
that financially benefit from trafficked labor even if the labortrafficking violation occurred abroad or was perpetrated in the supply
14
chain of the corporation by a separate legal entity.
Due to the applicability of the TVPRA to corporations, corporate
directors should now implement systems to oversee and monitor
corporate supply chains to eliminate and prevent trafficking
violations. 15 Where corporate directors fail to minimize the risk of suit
and potential reputational harm stemming from trafficking violations
by not having strong information systems in place, shareholders may
16
file derivative suits for breach of the directors' fiduciary duties.

9.
18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2012); Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney
General: A Model for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
247, 280 (2009); Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 5, at 1, 3, 16 (2004) ("Using civil litigation as a
strategy for compensating victims of trafficking is emerging as a powerful tool in the United States
for addressing the growing problem of modern-day slavery, both at national and at global levels.");
Current Federal Laws, supra note 3.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595 (2012); Polaris Project-Trafficking Victims' Protection Act
10.
(TVPA)-Fact Sheet, POLARIS PROJECT (2008), http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resourcefile/trafficking%20victims%20protection %20act%20fact%20sheet_0.pdf [perma.cc/W2TM-69L8].
11. PolarisProject-Trafficking Victims'ProtectionAct (TVPA)--Fact Sheet, supra note 10.
12.
The word "employ" is used here because it connotes an understanding of a labor
relationship. Important to note, however, is that this use of "employ," and any additional use of
the word throughout this Note, does not necessarily describe a relationship where the employee is
being paid, as the employee may continue to work out of fear without regular wages.
13.
18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2012).
14.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595-96 (2012).
15.
See generally Corporate Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 1-2
(explaining that potential corporate liability for supply-chain trafficking should result in
"companies [that are] engaged in businesses where trafficking is known to occur [being] vigilant
in investigating their suppliers, rooting out the problem at its source, and establishing solid
prevention policies and practices"); infra Part IV.
16. Infra Section IV.B.ii.
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The financial benefit provision of the 2008 TVPRA alters the
corporate status quo. Corporate directors must be aware that human
rights activists can rely on the TVPRA for litigation striving for
corporate accountability. 17 The financial benefit provision creates
liability for corporate actions that were once immune from judgment.1 8
To avoid criminal and civil liability, corporations must alter existing
business practices to diminish incentives for suppliers to rely on
trafficked labor. 19 Directors should be aware of the circumstances and
factors that indicate use of trafficked labor in order to make decisions
20
in good faith and avoid liability for failure to fulfill fiduciary duties.
Financial loss due to litigation under the TVPRA or reputational
damage from publicized trafficking violations provides a basis for
shareholder derivative suits enforcing a director's fiduciary duty when
a corporation fails to have systems in place to monitor corporate
21
activity.
This Note analyzes corporate responsibility to monitor human
trafficking violations in the supply chain springing from legal and
fiduciary obligations under the TVPRA. It proposes that corporate
directors' fiduciary duty to make informed decisions in good faith
encompasses an obligation to affirmatively monitor the corporate
supply chain for indications of trafficked labor.22 Part I discusses
human trafficking and its role in global supply chains of multinational
corporations. This Part also describes a corporate director's fiduciary
duty with regard to human rights violations. Part II considers the use
of litigation as a tool of corporate accountability and discusses why
current laws other than the TVPRA have not created the same litigation
risks to corporations for supply-chain trafficking violations. Part III
introduces the TVPRA and discusses the criminal and civil liability
provisions for financial benefit from human trafficking. Part IV
17.

See Martina

TRAFFICKING

PRO

E. Vandenberg, Ending Impunity, Securing Justice, THE HUMAN
BONo

LEGAL

CENTER

AND

THE

FREEDOM

FUND

13

(2015),

http://www.htprobono.org/wp-contentluploads/2015/12/FF SL AW02_WEB.pdf [http://perma.cc/
35UY-GBT9] (encouraging strategic litigation to combat trafficking violations and mentioning the
TVPRA as a necessity for civil anti-trafficking litigation in the United States).
18. Infra Part IV.
19. See generally Corporate Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 2-18
(discussing various laws that could be applied to render corporations liable for trafficking
violations).
20. See In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining that a director's
duty requires an adequate "information and reporting system"); CorporateLiability and Human
Trafficking, supra note 1, at 18 (mentioning a potential director duty to monitor for human
trafficking but failing to explain how they work in practice).
21. Caremark,698 A.2d at 970 (describing a duty to have adequate reporting systems in place).
22. See CorporateLiability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 18 (suggesting directors
may have a duty to monitor for human trafficking).
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discusses a plaintiffs ability to apply the financial benefit provisions to
human trafficking violations in global corporate supply chains. This
Part also addresses how the TVPRA may be used as a basis for a
shareholder derivative suit against directors where a corporation fails
to monitor its labor and the labor of its suppliers for the presence of
human trafficking. Directors' failure to actively monitor corporate
supply chains could be considered bad faith and reckless disregard of
trafficking, and such a risk of corporate liability may violate those
directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders. Finally, this Part
recommends clear steps a corporate director may take to avoid liability
for corporate violations of the TVPRA and failure of his or her own
fiduciary duty.
I. HUMAN TRAFFICKING

23

Consumers, business officers, and politicians are growing more
aware of corporate human rights violations and, in particular,
trafficking violations in global supply chains. 24 In 2015, the U.S.
23. Academic interest in human trafficking is an emerging issue, and thus there remains
variance in the language used to describe this crime. For this Note, the term "labor trafficking"
and "trafficked labor" will be used to describe labor trafficking as defined in 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(B)
(2012) as "the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor
or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary
servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery." Note that under this definition, transportation may
be an element of human trafficking, but it is not a required element. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
REPORT
7
(2015),
TRAFFICKING
IN
PERSONS
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf [hereinafter TIP Report 2015]. Cf.
Aguirre v. Best Care Agency, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 427, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("Violations of the
TVPRA are often referred to as 'human trafficking.' ").
24. Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 2 ("Around the world, investigative reporters regularly
unearth stories of human trafficking and modern-day slavery. Human rights organizations
document forced labor abuses in report after report. These stories dominate headlines and inspire
editorials."). Reliable statistics analyzing the prevalence and gravity of human trafficking are hard
to find due to its illegal and therefore hidden nature, inconsistent definitions, and lack of victims'
testimony. E.g., STEPHANIE A. LIMONCELLI, THE POLITICS OF TRAFFICKING 14 (2010); Jennifer S.
Nam, Note, The Case of the Missing Case: Examining the Civil Right of Action for Human
Trafficking Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2007); Elizabeth M. Wheaton, Edward J.
Schauer & Thomas V. Galli, Economicsof Human Trafficking, 48 INT'LMIGRATION 114, 118 (2010);
Profits and Poverty, INT'L LABOUR OFFICE 3 (2014), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/ groups/public/--[http://perma.cc/ 24B3-DSTJ]
ed norm/---declarationdocuments/publicationwcms_243391.pdf
[hereinafter Profits and Poverty]. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has stated 21
million people are trafficked today, while End Slavery Now estimates about 28 million people are
trafficked. Profits and Poverty, supra, at 1 (this number includes people "in forced labour,
trafficked, held in debt bondage, or work in slave-like conditions"); Slavery Today, END SLAVERY
Now, http://endslaverynow.org/learn/slavery-today [http://perma.ccVRP7-L3TR] (this number
refers to people in "some kind of slavery"); see also INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, A GLOBAL ALLIANCE
AGAINST FORCED LABOUR, GLOBAL REPORT UNDER THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE ILO DECLARATION ON
RIGHTS
AT
WORK
2005
1
(2005),
FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES
AND
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ednorm---declaration/documents/
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Department of State highlighted human trafficking in global supply
chains in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report.2 5 In 2012, the
International Labour Office estimated that traffickers held about 10.7
million people in non-domestic labor trafficking, producing an average
26
of $4,000 profit per individual each year.
27
Labor trafficking occurs both in the United States and abroad.
Consider the case of an Indian citizen, recruited to work in the United
States with promises of a green card and permanent residency, "and
forced . . . to pay inbound travel expenses, visa expenses, and other
recruiting expenses." 28 He is lured to the job with "false promises and
representations," but upon arrival in the United States he is confronted
with "deplorable conditions," faces high debts he must repay, and is
29
forced to continue working despite being "discriminated against."
Furthermore, he is fearful of bringing legal action due to his employer's
threats, and he fears leaving because he believes that staying with the
30
employer is the only way to keep his proper immigration status.
Several individuals brought a claim, decided by a jury in 2015, under
31
the TVPRA's forced labor provision for just these alleged conditions
As long as the profit to traffickers from using fear or fraud to subject
workers to harmful conditions is greater than the cost to traffickers of
32
legal penalties, stories such as this one will continue to exist.

publication/wems_081882.pdf [http://perma.cc/R7CV-WHZ8] ("Forced labour is present in some
form on all continents, in almost all countries, and in every kind of economy.").
25. TIP Report 2015, supra note 23, at 13-34:
Long and complex supply chains that cross multiple borders and rely on an array of
subcontractors impede traceability and make it challenging to verify that the goods and
services bought and sold every day are untouched by modern-day slaves ....
Governments, the private sector, and individuals can all make a difference when it
comes to addressing human trafficking in supply chains.
26. Profits and Poverty, supra note 24, at 21. But see supranote 24 (discussing the reliability
of trafficking statistics).
27. See TIP Report 2015, supranote 23, at 352 ('The United States is a source, transit, and
destination country for ...forced labor."); supra note 24.
28. David v. Signal Int'l, 37 F. Supp. 3d 822, 824-25, 832 (E.D. La. 2014).
29. Id. at 825, 832.
30. Id. at 832.
31. Id. at 825, 831-33; Kathy Finn, Indian Workers Win $14 Million in U.S. Labor
Trafficking Case, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2015/02/19/us-usa[perma.cc/HX3Jlouisiana-trafficking-idUSKBNOLN03820150219#UkpCFxtEZLtlBoDJ.97
FXTG].
32.

GARY A. HAUGEN & VICTOR BOUTROS, THE LOCUST EFFECT: WHY THE END OF POVERTY

REQUIRES THE END OF VIOLENCE 67-68 (2014) ("[Florced labor is a category of violence that is
driven entirely by money and the willingness to put violence to work as an economic enterprise.");
Wheaton, et al., supra note 24, at 118-19.
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A. Human Trafficking Defined
Labor trafficking, or "forced labor," describes the practice of
using fear, coercion, or deceit to force an individual to work in return
for a bare level of survival, allowing the perpetrator of the violence, lies,
or schemes to profit. 33 Labor trafficking not only describes poor working
conditions or insufficient pay, but also involves a situation wheredespite a desire to leave-a worker cannot escape. 34 Due to the
vulnerability of individuals as a result of poverty and lack of police
protection, "low-income countries tend to have the highest levels of
slavery." 35 In developing countries, vulnerable populations, which
include victims of trafficking, are not protected by law enforcement, and
therefore perpetrators of trafficking have practical immunity under
36
their own nations' laws.
The most prevalent form of labor trafficking today is bonded
labor, where a trafficker exploits a victim's ignorance about debt. 37 For
example, an employer may offer a loan upfront to encourage an
individual to take a deceptively appealing job, but the worker is then
compelled to work until the loan is repaid. 38 While attempting to repay
the loan, the worker likely has no control over wages, the wages will
never be sufficient for the loan to be repaid, and the individual is
forcibly and violently prevented from leaving. 39 In The Locust Effect, the
authors give a vivid description of the use of violence and fear to prevent
an individual from escaping bonded labor, saying:

33. HAUGEN & BOUTROS, supra note 32, at 67-68; Wheaton, et al., supra note 24, at 117
("[P]rofit is the driving motive for human trafficking.") (footnote omitted); Profits and Poverty,
supra note 24, at 20.
34. Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991, 1014 (S.D. Ind.2007); Muchira v. AlRawaf, No. 1:14-cv-770, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49806, at *30-31 (E.D. Va. Apr. 15, 2015)":
No matter how unpleasant the work, or the conditions under which services are
provided, the critical inquiry for the purposes of the TVPA is whether a person provides
those services free from a defendant's physical or psychological coercion that as a
practical matter eliminates the ability to exercise free will or choice.
35. HAUGEN & BOUTROS, supra note 32, at 69 (footnote omitted); see also SIDDHARTH KARA,
BONDED LABOR 6 (2012) ("Perhaps the most important feature shared by bonded laborers in South
Asia is extreme poverty.").
36. HAUGEN & BOUTROS, supra note 32, at xiii-xv ("[B]asic law enforcement systems in the
developing world are so broken that global studies now confirm that most poor people live outside
the protection of law."); id. at 73-74 ("[A]ll of this grotesque violence in the bonded labor system is
illegal and only possible because it is legitimized by the complicity of local authorities."); Wheaton,
et al., supra note 24, at 117.
37. HAUGEN & BOUTROS, supra note 32, at 70-71; KARA, supra note 35, at 3-4.
38. HAUGEN & BOUTROS, supra note 32, at 70-72.
39. Id.
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"[T]he murders are shocking: Madur, a 12-year-old boy held as a bonded laborer in the
Mohan Reddy Brick Factory, says he watched while the overseers tied his dad to a post
in the middle of the brick yard and beat him to death because Madur had run away from
40
the facility."

In other situations, a worker may be required to pay large
recruitment or transportation fees, and the employer will charge such
a high interest rate that it is not feasible for the employee to ever escape
the high debt. 41 Alternatively, a trafficker may provide a worker and
his family with housing and food while demanding they work for little
or no pay and forcing them to stay using violence. 42 Traffickers may also
steal a worker's passport or other legal documents, which prevents the
43
individual from leaving.
B. CorporateBenefit from Human Trafficking
Multinational corporations financially benefit from trafficked
laborers working in their supply chains by obtaining cheaper goods due
to low labor costs, since labor from trafficked workers is cheaper than
from paid employees. 44 Economically, trafficking is only profitable while
the profits exceed the costs, which may include "housing, clothing, and
feeding workers" and "physical, psychological, and criminal costs. ' 45 In
some circumstances, corporations at the end of the supply chain may
avoid the actual costs of providing for the workers, but they can still
46
profit from obtaining cheaper goods.
Labor trafficking creates estimated profits of $43.40 billion
annually worldwide. 47 To put these profits in perspective, if labor
trafficking were a corporation, it would have the highest profits of all
the Fortune 500 companies-edging out the next most profitable

40. Id. at 71.
41. Profits and Poverty, supra note 24, at 20.
42. TIP Report 2015, supra note 23, at 15 (describing reasons workers cannot leave these
jobs); id.
43. See TIP Report 2015, supra note 23, at 15-18 (describing labor recruitment practices).
44. See, e.g., Bang, supra note 2, at 262-63, 268; Wheaton, et al., supra note 24, at 128
("Employers may seek trafficked individuals as a cheaper labor source .....
45. Wheaton, et al., supra note 24, at 124, 128-30.
46. Id. at 129-30:
At a low level, employers use trafficked labour for production in sweatshops, agriculture,
and domestic labour. On the next level, producers subcontract jobs out to lower cost
producers. A third level includes the intermediaries who obtain the goods from producers
to supply to larger corporations. At the top, international corporations demand the lowest
priced goods for resale to consumers and to increase shareholder dividends.
47. Profits and Poverty, supra note 24, at 13.
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company by $3.89 billion. 48 Moreover, for multinational corporations
using foreign labor sources, harms to individuals and society from the
trafficking violations are geographically separated from any positive
49
well-being produced by the corporation in its home country.
C. CorporateIncentives to Regulate Human Trafficking
Prior to the initial passage of the TVPRA in 2000, no law
specifically targeted human trafficking violations.50 Corporations have
acted with legal impunity for supply-chain trafficking violations due to
a scarcity of cases being brought under the TVPRA and an ability to
avoid liability for actions of corporate affiliates under other legal
regimes.5 1 In 2014 there were only 216 criminal convictions based on
labor trafficking worldwide-a stark number compared to estimates of
over twenty million people in various forms of human trafficking
globally.5 2 Weak penalties for trafficking violations in the United States
prior to passage of the TVPRA in 2000, coupled with a desire for low
labor costs and cheap goods, have provided little or no incentive for a
corporation to be concerned with legal compliance.5 3 High pressure to
cut costs and raise profits encourages corporations to be lax in
48. Fortune 500, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/fortune500/ [http://perma.cc/4JMC-KJY7]
(last visited Feb. 25, 2016) (filtering by "profits"). The current leader of the Fortune 500 in terms
of profit is Apple, with $39,510 billion per year. Id.
49. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 750 (2002) ("[T]ransnational corporations with
headquarters in one country have engaged in activities that are alleged to have had serious,
negative implications for people or the environment in another country .... "); David Nersessian,
Business Lawyers as Worldwide Moral Gatekeepers? Legal Ethics and Human Rights in Global
CorporatePractice, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135, 1184 (2015) ("[I]n global commerce, there is
real potential for both geographic and analytic remoteness from the actual perpetration of human
rights violations.").
50. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012) (discussing the state of human trafficking regulations prior
to the TVPRA).
51.
See Sarah C. Pierce, Note, Turning a Blind Eye: U.S. CorporateInvolvement in Modern
Day Slavery, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 577, 588 (2011) ("Corporate involvement in human
trafficking within the United States usually occurs in elaborate subcontracting schemes.");
Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 2 ("[S]trategic litigation ... is a direct challenge to the impunity
[perpetrators of human trafficking] currently enjoy. It also serves as a genuine deterrent to wouldbe traffickers in an environment where other deterrents are sorely lacking."); infra Part II.
According to a LexisAdvance search, as of February 26, 2016, only twenty-five cases were brought
between 2008 and 2016 citing § 1595 and mentioning the "knowingly benefits, financially"
language.
52. TIP Report 2015, supra note 23, at 48; supranote 24. In 2013, there were 470. TIP Report
2015, supra note 23, at 48. In 2012, there were 518. Id.
53. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012) (discussing the state of human trafficking regulations prior
to the TVPRA); E. Christopher Johnson, Jr., The CorporateLawyer, Human Trafficking, and Child
Labor: Who's in your Supply Chain?, 30 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 27, 33-34 (2013) (discussing
corporate incentives and disincentives to monitor supply chains).
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monitoring labor conditions, an effort which requires time and
resources. 54 Because victims of human trafficking may be uneducated,
poor, foreign nationals unaware of their legal rights, prosecutors may
have difficulty finding victims and evidence to support criminal
55
prosecution, and victims may be poorly situated to bring civil suits.
Without enforcement of the TVPRA provision criminalizing
financial benefit from trafficking, multinational corporations lack
strong financial incentives to monitor their suppliers' work
environments.5 6 However, without monitoring their suppliers' labor
practices, these corporations risk getting entangled in human
trafficking themselves. 7 Human rights activists' increased enthusiasm
for litigation as a means of corporate accountability and a recent legal
decision in favor of trafficking victims suggest the current incentive
58
structure for monitoring labor conditions may change.
D. Directors'FiduciaryDuty to Regulate Human Trafficking
Under the business judgment rule, courts afford corporate
directors discretion in decisionmaking, provided those decisions are
made in good faith, after reasonable diligence, and are not selfdealing. 59 Chancellor Allen established in In re CaremarkInternational
that "a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to
assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the
54. See TIP Report 2015, supranote 23, at 33 ("[C]onstant pressure on cutting costs can have
a destabilizing effect on the proactive measures a company may take to prevent human
trafficking."); Pierce, supra note 51, at 587 ("The demand for lower prices by buyers from
corporations, both within and outside of the United States, indirectly drives the number of human
trafficking cases."); Editorial, Forced Labor on American Shores, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2012),
[http:/!
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/opinion/forced-labor-on-american-shores.html
perma.cc/R3UQ-5WRR].
55. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (describing the factors that make individuals susceptible to
trafficking); infra notes 146-154 and accompanying text (describing reasons why lawyers may not
be bringing cases under the TVPRA).
56. See Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 3 ("Even by the most conservative estimate, the
obvious lack of risk for perpetrators of human trafficking and forced labor is astounding.").
57. See Naomi Jiyoung Bang, Justice for Victims of Human Trafficking and Forced Labor:
Why Current Theories of Corporate Liability Do Not Work, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (2013)
("Multinational corporations who produce goods through massive global production chains also
increase chances that their products could be made by trafficked workers.").
58. Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 2 (encouraging human rights lawyers to actively pursue
justice for trafficking victims through strategic litigation). In David v. Signal International,LLC,
a jury awarded $14 million to workers who alleged trafficking violations under §§ 1589 and 1590
of the TVPRA. 37 F. Supp. 3d 822, 831-33 (E.D. La. 2014) (describing the sufficiency of the TVPA
§ 1589 claims to survive a motion to dismiss); Finn, supra note 31. Due to this and other trafficking
cases, Signal International, LLC filed for bankruptcy. Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 7.
59. E.g., CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 222 (4th ed. 2003).
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board concludes is adequate, exists." 60 Caremarkset the precedent that
a director's failure to establish or have in place a "reasonable
information and reporting system" may demonstrate a lack of good
faith, which deprives the directors of the protection of the business
61
judgment rule and exposes them to liability.
Additionally, corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to protect
the interests of shareholders, which generally requires maximizing the
corporation's stock price. 62 Litigation or reputational harm affecting
consumer choices creates heavy corporate costs. 63 To maximize
shareholder wealth, directors should take steps to avoid negative
publicity and expensive, time-consuming litigation that may hurt stock
prices. 64 When a corporation does not behave in a socially responsible
manner, the public may boycott its goods, media may highlight the
company's failures, shareholders may sell their shares, and
management may leave.6 5 Some human rights NGOs use the tactic of
60. 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
61.
Id. at 971.
See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 59, at 226-29, 276; Daniel J. Morrissey, The
62.
Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 353, 353
(2015) ("Corporations exist primarily to make profit for their shareholders. This has been the black
letter rule of law and the reigning orthodoxy of American business for a century.").
63.

See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 14

(2004) ("[Clivil suits can potentially result in huge damages awards, directly harming
...
); Corporate Liability and Human
[transnational corporations'] financial bottom line.
Trafficking, supra note 1, at 1 ("Legal liability can, in turn, hurt the reputation of companies and
the interests of their investors."); Press Release, U.S. Equal Opportunity Emp't Comm'n, Judge
Orders John Pickle Co. to Pay $1.24 Million to 52 Foreign Workers in "Human Trafficking" Case
(May 26, 2006), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-26-06.cfm [perma.cc/P929-R22K];
infra note 180 and accompanying text.
64.
Erika R. George & Scarlet R. Smith, In Good Company: How Corporate Social
Responsibility Can Protect Rights and Aid Efforts to End Child Sex Trafficking and Modern
Slavery, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 55, 106 (2013) ("[A] good reputation is good for stock prices
because it allows stakeholders to trust that the business is capable of delivering valued outcomes
and competitors cannot imitate having a good reputation with stakeholders."). But see JOSEPH,
supra note 63, at 7 (explaining that the relationship between stock prices and negative publicity
is unclear); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between
CompetitiveAdvantage and CorporateSocial Responsibility, HARVARD BuS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 83,
https://hbr.org/2006/12/strategy-and-society-the-link-between-competitive-advantage-andcorporate-social-responsibility [http://perma.cc/6DKZ-SGWF ] ("As for the concept of [corporate
social responsibility] as insurance, the connection between the good deeds and consumer attitudes
is so indirect as to be impossible to measure.").
65. JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 6. For example, Nike and publicized reports of terrible labor
conditions "has now become an object lesson in how giant corporations can be brought to account
by ordinary consumers." Simon Birch, How Activism ForcedNike to Change its Ethical Game, THE
GUARDIAN (July 6, 2012, 11:04), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/green-livingblog/2012/jul/06/activism-nike (last modified Dec. 29, 2015, 7:46) [perma.cc/5FVB-6SEQ]; see Max
Nisen, How Nike Solved Its Sweatshop Problem, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 9, 2013, 10:00 PM),
(describing
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-nike-solved-its-sweatshop-problem-2013-5,
Nike's response to negative consumer reaction to its labor practices) [http://perma.cc/65AD-9F5Q].
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"naming and shaming" corporations with human rights violations, such
that a corporation may find difficulty avoiding reputational
consequences of rights violations. 66 As consumers become more aware
of supply-chain human rights violations generally, 67 some may
consciously consider a corporation's reputation with regard to human
rights when making purchasing decisions. 6 Publicized human rights
violations can result in severe reputational damage to a corporation,
regardless of whether the corporate officers attempt to mitigate the
problem once publicized or whether the alleged violations result in
69
actual corporate liability.

66. See JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 6 ("Numerous prominent corporations have suffered the
wrath of high profile negative NGO campaigns, including Nestl6, Shell, McDonalds, Coca Cola,
and Nike."); Janine S. Hiller & Shannon S. Hiller, A Co-opetition Approach to Business, Human
Rights Organizationsand Due Diligence, in LAW, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 118, 120 (Robert
C. Bird et al. eds., 2014):
[T]ensions and conflict between businesses and human rights organizations persist,
perhaps as the norm, fueled at least in part by the tactics used by human rights
organizations to derive their power and influence over private sector entities by means
of a 'name and shame' approach that utilizes the media and public opinion to identify
and then pressure a company into taking remedial actions.
67. See Corporate Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 2 ("[The U.S.
Government] has called worldwide attention to this blight and made it difficult for individuals and
organizations engaged in businesses plagued by trafficking to claim ignorance about the
problem.").
68. Morrissey, supra note 62, at 382 ("Approximately 77% of consumers now say it is
important for business to be socially responsible and 50% of them take that into consideration
when they buy things." (footnotes omitted)); Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum:
Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 850
(2008) (stating fifty-two percent of consumers claim they seek information on corporate social
practices); see Johnson, supra note 53, at 33-34 (citing a Harvard University study stating
consumers consider anti-trafficking efforts of a corporation in purchasing decisions). But see DEVA,
supra note 4, at 140-43 (explaining that not all consumers consider human rights when making
purchasing choices due to information-sharing failures, disinclination to consider human rights in
making purchasing decisions, failure to understand the relationship between human rights and a
particular company, and inability to afford higher costs of ethically-sourced goods).
69. Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an EmergingFiduciaryDuty to Consider
Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 77, 93-94 (2005) ('The risks to business reputation from
credible allegations of human rights abuses create incentives for companies and directors to
consider these issues seriously, irrespective of whether an ultimate finding of liability is likely.");
Nisen, supra note 65 (describing protests against Nike regarding labor practices even after the
corporation created a code of conduct and "establishe[d] a department tasked with working to
improve the lives of factory laborers"); see also Williams, supra note 49, at 736 (stating that citizens
have higher expectations of corporate social responsibility than mere compliance with law).
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II. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH LITIGATION

As society becomes increasingly aware of corporate human
rights violations, 70 activists are placing more emphasis on litigation as
a means for an injured party to impose costs on the corporation that
profited from the harm, as well as raise awareness of the existence and
prevalence of the human rights violations. 71 Civil litigation can hold
corporations accountable for crimes prosecutors may overlook or choose
not to pursue. 72 However, litigation is a slow and expensive method of
holding corporations accountable and less effective than having strong
corporate monitoring systems to prevent trafficking violations from
73
occurring in the first place.
Although laws other than the TVPRA do criminalize aspects of
supply-chain trafficking, difficulties in applying these laws have made
corporations effectively immune from liability for trafficking violations
in the past. 74 Three primary difficulties exist today for applying laws
enacted prior to the TVPRA in 2000 to a multinational corporation's
supply-chain trafficking: (1) a lack of jurisdiction over trafficking
violations that occur abroad, (2) an inability to prosecute a corporation
at the end of the supply chain that benefits from but does not directly
perpetrate human rights violations, and (3) a lack of statutes that
criminalize trafficking entirely rather than just elements of the crime. 75
A. JurisdictionalLimitations for CorporateAccountability
Corporations are not insulated from liability simply because
human rights violations occur in different countries. 76 Accordingly,
corporate directors should be aware of how a court's jurisdiction over
77
crimes committed abroad affects their corporation's litigation risks.
70. In 2014, President Obama named January 2015 "National Slavery and Human
Trafficking Prevention Month." Proclamation No. 9225, 80 F.R. 825 (Dec. 31, 2014).
71.
See Beth Stephens, Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Against Individuals and
Corporations, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS 179, 179, 185, 199
(Lara Blecher et al. eds., 2014).
72. Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 5, at 16-18.
73. Infra Section IV.C. (describing appropriate corporate monitoring).
74. Bang, supra note 2, at 257 ("Corporations driving [the use of human trafficking and
forced labor in supply chains] easily avoid accountability given the extraterritorial location of
suppliers, and the appearance of 'arm's length' contracts with their suppliers.") (footnote omitted);
infra Section II.B.
75.
See Bang, supra note 2, at 257 (noting problems with extraterritoriality and "arm's
length" contracts in holding corporations accountable).
76. Infra note 77 and accompanying text.
77. See CorporateLiability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 1-2.
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The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") is a jurisdictional statute that grants
courts subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign violations of
international law. 78 A string of human rights cases relying on the ATS
for jurisdiction over foreign torts after 1980 raised activists' hopes of
litigation as a tool for human rights reform. 79 However, significant
limitations of the ATS have reduced its applicability in the foreign
80
supply-chain context.
Under the ATS, a plaintiff that has suffered a tortious violation
of international law that is "specific, universal, and obligatory" has a
private cause of action.8 1 Labor trafficking and slavery are
82
internationally accepted crimes that are actionable under the ATS.

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980); CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L.
78.
GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 409 (5th ed. 2014). The ATS was enacted in 1789 as part of
the Judiciary Act but was hardly used until 1980, when the Second Circuit held the ATS granted
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign torts. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 887; see also Stephens, supra
note 71, at 181-82, 181 n.ll (explaining that prior to Filartiga,only twenty-one cases were brought
under the ATS); Williams, supranote 49, at 750 (explaining that the ATS provides subject-matter
jurisdiction in United States federal courts); BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 78, at 409.
79. Robert C. Thompson, Anita Ramasastry & Mark B. Taylor, Transnational Corporate
Responsibility for the 21st Century: Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for
Business Entities Implicated in InternationalCrimes, 40 GEO. WASH. INTL L. REv. 841, 842 (2009)
("Since the decision in Unocal, every year litigants have filed increasing numbers of ATCA cases
involving the complicity of corporations in human rights abuses outside the United States.");
Stephens, supra note 71, at 184-85 (noting that between 1980 and 2004, "about eighty cases were
filed asserting ATS jurisdiction, but only about a dozen led to final judgments in favor of the
plaintiffs"); see, e.g., Filartiga,630 F.2d at 889 (stating the ATS grants jurisdiction in the United
States for a claim of torture against a citizen of Paraguay); see also DEVA, supra note 4, at 6
(discussing the ATCA's use in corporate human rights litigation).
80. See Warfaa v. Ali, No. 14-1810, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1670, at *10 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016)
("[Riecent Supreme Court decisions have significantly limited, if not rejected, the applicability of
the Filartiga rationale." (citations omitted)); Williams, supra note 49, at 750 (discussing the
limitations of the ATS); Stephens, supra note 71, at 192-93 (noting that "foreign plaintiffs suing a
foreign corporation for events that took place in a foreign country" could not have jurisdiction
under the ATS).
81.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004); Williams, supra note 49, at 764-65;
see Stephens, supra note 71, at 184; see also Williams & Conley, supra note 69, at 85-86 ("By
recognizing that the ATCA establishes a federal cause of action based on evolving, international
law norms of obligatory behavior, Sosa allowed the continuing development of case law to inform
thinking about companies' human rights obligations."). Rules of international law are determined
based on the international law of today, not as it was at the time the ATS was passed. Filartiga,
630 F.2d at 881 ("Thus it is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it was in
1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today."). The Second Circuit
explained in Kadic v. Karadzicthat the scope of the ATS includes suits against private defendants.
Williams & Conley, supra note 69, at 82.
82. See Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2009) ("Numerous
courts within the United States have found trafficking, forced labor, and involuntary servitude
cognizable under ATS." (citing Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2008);
In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2001);
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997))).
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Therefore courts have subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATS over
83
trafficking violations that occur abroad.
In 2013, the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. curtailed activists' goals of sweeping corporate
accountability through ATS litigation.8 4 After Kiobel, courts only have
ATS jurisdiction if claims "touch and concern the territory of the United
States."8 5 While not completely quashing corporate human rights
litigation brought by foreign plaintiffs,8 6 the court's decision in Kiobel
reduced the number of cases in which the ATS can provide the means
of establishing corporate liability for human trafficking violations in the
87
global supply chain.
No longer can the ATS create federal jurisdiction if a foreign
victim of human trafficking were to sue a corporation with minimal
links to the United States for trafficking violations that occurred
abroad.8 8 Courts, therefore, lack jurisdiction under the ATS over actions
of corporate suppliers in foreign countries with minimal links to the
83. See id.
84. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (2013); see Warfaa, 2016 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1670, at * 11 (explaining that after Kiobel, "the reach of the ATS is narrow and strictly
circumscribed") (citation omitted)); see also Paul Hoffman, The Implicationsof Kiobel for Corporate
Accountability Litigation under the Alien Tort Statute, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS IMPACTS, supra note 71, at 201, 221 ('The new Kiobel presumption can be seen as a
broader, more discretionary tool to screen out additional ATS cases-beyond those that the
existing screening mechanisms catch-that the court believes lack an adequate connection to the
United States or threaten U.S. foreign policy."). The presumption against extraterritoriality is a
principle of legislative interpretation that indicates legislation is read to apply domestically unless
clear Congressional intent indicates a broader application. BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 78,
at 93. The Court held that the principles of the presumption against extraterritoriality (though
not the presumption itself) apply to claims brought under the ATS. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668;
Hoffman, supra, at 204-05, 210 ("[Tjhe Roberts opinion concedes that the usual presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. substantive statutes does not apply to the ATS; in
fact, the presumption had never before been applied to any jurisdictional statutes.").
85. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668-69; see Warfaa, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1670, at *14-15
(describing cases where the extraterritoriality presumption prevented a case from having
jurisdiction under the ATS); Hoffman, supra note 84, at 206 ("The majority opinion, though,
provides little guidance about the meaning of the new term, touch and concern.").
86. See Bang, supra note 2, at 274 (explaining that the Kiobel ruling left the possibility of
claims against corporate defendants); Hoffman, supra note 84, at 207, 216-21 (questioning how
the presumption against extraterritoriality will be applied to different fact scenarios); Stephens,
supra note 71, at 180, 193 ("Kiobel leaves unresolved the status of claims that have a greater
connection to U.S. territory than those at issue in Kiobel, such as claims filed against U.S. citizens,
including U.S. corporations; claims against individuals living in the United States; and claims that
involve events occurring in the United States."); CorporateLiabilityand Human Trafficking, supra
note 1, at 8 (listing some criteria circuit courts have found that meet the "touch and concern"
requirements).
87. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668; CorporateLiability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at
7. It has not been decided whether corporate fiduciary duties are sufficient to establish the "touch
and concern" standard, and such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Note.
88. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668-69.
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United States, and courts cannot reach American corporations that
benefit from but do not directly commit these crimes without legal
theories of agency, joint liability, or aiding and abetting.8 9 This
limitation of ATS litigation for corporate accountability demonstrates
the need for the TVPRA to hold U.S. corporations accountable for
deriving financial benefit from trafficked labor. 90
B. Limitations of Legislation for CorporateAccountability
Although the TVPRA, discussed in detail below, is the first law
to comprehensively target human trafficking, several other laws apply
to elements of human trafficking violations in the multinational
corporate supply-chain context. 91 For example, the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act applies to involuntary
servitude, trafficking, or slavery that occurs abroad, but it can be
challenging to apply.9 2 The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") does not
apply extraterritorially.9 3 In international law, international criminal
89. Corporate Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 8 (questioning how aiding
and abetting theories may be applied to slavery cases under the ATS). Mere corporate presence is
insufficient to establish an ATS claim. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; Hoffman, supra note 84, at 206;
90. See Bang, supra note 2, at 260, 274; see also Bang, supra note 57, at 1065 ("On the bright
side, since the Second Circuit's opinion only affected the ATCA, plaintiffs are still free to pursue
claims under other relevant statutes, such as the TVPRA, where attacks on extra-territoriality
and corporate liability appear weak given a stronger and clearer legislative history.").
91.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-97 (2000); MOHAMED Y. MATTAR, Corporate Liability for Violations of
International Human Rights Law, in LABOUR MIGRATION, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE COMMODIFICATION OF ILLICIT FLOWS 10-11 (Ato Quayson
and Antonela Arhin eds., 2012); Bang, supranote 57, at 1055-83; Naomi Jiyoung Bang, Navigating
the Complexities of Corporate Liability in Human Trafficking and Forced Labor Cases, 75 TEX.
B.J. 766, 768 (2012). Depending on the fact pattern, plaintiffs and prosecutors can use a variety of
laws: aiding and abetting under the ATS, principal-agent theories of law, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), third party benefits, alter-ego theories of law, the Child
Labor Deterrence Act, the 2000 Trade and Development Act, the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA), the Anti-Peonage Act, laws against involuntary servitude, and the Thirteenth
Amendment of the Constitution; e.g., MATTAR, supra, at 10-11; Bang, supra note 57, at 1055-83;
Bang, supra, at 768 (explaining that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) may be used to hold corporations accountable for human trafficking, although successfully
arguing a RICO claim may be difficult); Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 5, at 26; Pierce, supra
note 51, at 584. There are also several state laws that target human trafficking, but a discussion
of all fifty different regulatory regimes is beyond the scope of this Note. See Pierce, supra note 51,
at 591-93 (describing state anti-trafficking laws that create corporate liability).
92. See JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 79-80 (noting that RICO can apply to cases of forced labour
and other human rights abuses); Bang, supra note 2, at 276 (explaining RICO has complicated
pleading requirements); Corporate Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 3
("Knowingly engaging in human trafficking has been expressly subject to criminal prosecution
under RICO since 2003.").
93. Erika C. Collins, ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Employment Laws, 2006 A.B.A.
SEC. INT'L L. 6-7. At least one court has even suggested that a claim of forced labor would be better
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because
tribunals serve as an inadequate alternative to domestic courts
94
corporations.
by
committed
they lack jurisdiction for offenses
Because other laws are not focused on trafficking directly, they
fail to properly criminalize trafficking violations, allowing corporations
to escape liability for violations they commit. 95 When laws only
criminalize part of traffickers' actions, such as poor labor conditions,
prosecution and civil suits fail to provide proper deterrence, and
corporations are not held accountable for human rights abuses from
which they benefit. 96 Additionally, laws may be unable to reach beyond
that
the supplier that actually perpetrates the crime to the corporation
97
derives financial benefit from its supplier's illegal actions.
Holding corporations accountable for human trafficking
violations by suppliers is a more difficult and attenuated argument to
make than accountability for violations committed by the corporation
itself.98 Corporations can sometimes rely on the legal separation
between themselves and a supplier to deflect liability for the supplier's
actions. 99 Where a supplier in a foreign country creates conditions of
force, fraud, or coercion, but a multinational corporation at the end of
the supply chain lacks control over the supplier, establishing sufficient
corporate control or authority over the trafficking offense for liability
brought under the TVPRA than the FLSA. Shuvalova v. Cunningham, No. C 10-02159 RS, 2010
WL 5387770, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010).
94. Thompson et al., supranote 79, at 870 (explaining that the Rome Statute does not include
legal persons in the jurisdiction of the ICC).
95. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(14) (2012) ("Existing legislation and law enforcement in the United
States and other countries are inadequate to deter trafficking and bring traffickers to justice,
failing to reflect the gravity of the offenses involved."); see also Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note
5, at 4 ("Until recently, trafficked persons could rely on sundry federal and state labor and
employment laws and tort laws related to forced labor conditions in order to seek remedies from
their traffickers."); Pierce, supra note 51, at 593-94 ("Current human trafficking legislation does
not hold corporations civilly and criminally liable."). Although Pierce includes the TVPRA in her
assessment that current laws do not create corporate liability, there is little analysis of the
potential for the financial benefit provision added in the 2008 reauthorization. See Pierce, supra
note 51, at 596 (mentioning the financial benefit standard is "still a difficult or impossible level to
reach").
96. See Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 5, at 24-26 (calling laws prior to the TVPRA
"incomplete avenues for relief").
97. Infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
98. See Bang, supra note 57, at 1049-50, 1054 (explaining the ineffectiveness of several
current methods of legal liability for human trafficking and the difficulties in finding a legal link
between a corporation and the party actually committing the human rights violation); Pierce,
supra note 51, at 589-90 (explaining it is difficult to hold corporations liable under agency
theories).
99. See DEVA, supra note 4, at 9 & n.38 (explaining how corporations use 'legal tools" to
escape liability for human rights violations); Pierce, supra note 51, at 578-79 (explaining that
plaintiffs face difficulties in establishing corporate liability where there is a subcontractor). But
see CorporateLiability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 3 (suggesting a RICO claim could
be brought against a company that "actively associated itself with a RICO enterprise").

20161

FINANCIAL BENEFITFROM TRAFFICKING

517

may be immensely challenging. 100 If a corporation's supplier is directly
responsible for trafficking, a court must establish both the existence of
an agency relationship and the culpability of the agent before it can find
that a corporation has violated the law.' 0 t
Although vicarious liability, joint liability, and theories of aiding
and abetting suggest corporations could be accountable for the actions
of their agents, 102 these theories create a poor incentive structure by
encouraging corporations to remain ignorant about what occurs in their
supply chains to avoid liability for trafficking violations. 03 Aiding and
abetting requires a purposeful intent-an intent that would not be
present if, for example, a corporation knew trafficking was occurring
and stated a preference for better labor conditions but refused to alter
prices or work quotas.10 Corporations can deflect accusations of
liability by denying knowledge or asserting their lack of physical control
over the systems that created and perpetuated the trafficking
conditions. 105
As a result, with the exception of the TVPRA, there is an absence
of domestic enforcement tools that apply to corporations that benefit
from trafficking violations. 0 6 However, since 2008 the TVPRA
100. See Bang, supra note 2, at 275 (stating that it is difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy elements
of control or authority in the context of crimes committed by overseas contractors).
101. Pierce, supranote 51, at 589-91.
102. See Bang, supra note 91, at 767-77 ("[A]n agency argument could prevail in the global
contracting context, [but] it appears that success may depend on the existence of evidence
supporting the 'control' aspect of the principal-agent relationship."); Karin Dryhurst, Note,
Liability Up the Supply Chain: CorporateAccountability for Labor Trafficking, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 641, 655 (2013) (explaining the application of vicarious liability doctrine to the contract
relationship); Corporate Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 4 (noting RICO could
be used against a corporation via a vicarious liability theory).
103. Dryhurst, supra note 102, at 655-56 ("[Tlhe traditional rule creates perverse incentives
for corporations to exert less control over their agents and structure independent contractor
relationships with thinly capitalized contractors.").
104. See Bang, supra note 2, at 278. Further, in international law, the elements of a crime of
aiding and abetting are currently debated, as inconsistencies exist. Guido Acquaviva, Aiding and
Abetting InternationalCrimes and the Value of Judicial Consistency: Reflections Prompted by the
Perisic, Taylor and Sainovic Verdicts, QUESTIONS OF INT'L L., June 1, 2014, at 3, 12-16,
http://www.qil-qdi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/02-FRAGMENTATION-ICL-AcquavivaFINAL-ter.pdf [perma.cc/L9YY-AP43].
105. Bang, supra note 2, at 277-78 ("Unless there is blatant direct evidence of active
wrongdoing, corporations continue to escape accountability.").
106. Thompson et al., supra note 79, at 886 ("Domestic prosecution of [international criminal
law] violations is a vital part of achieving justice and accountability."); see also Williams, supra
note 49, at 725 ("One of the defining features (and perhaps the defining feature) of globalization,
as it is now understood, is that it undermines the ability of sovereign nations to impose
substantive, proactive limits on economic actors such as transnational corporations .... "). There
still remain other difficulties with domestic litigation for international crimes, such as forum non
conveniens, state sovereignty, sovereign immunity, and the need for a court to find personal
jurisdiction. Stephens, supra note 71, at 185, 194-95 (explaining how sovereign immunity and
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criminalizes trafficking in the supply chains of multinational
corporations; it applies to corporations and individuals that financially
benefit from human trafficking, in addition to parties that directly
10 7
perpetrate the abuses.

III. TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION
REAUTHORIZATION ACT ("TVPRA")

Corporate directors have heightened fiduciary duties to monitor
and eliminate human trafficking violations based on the broad scope of
the TVPRA.10 8 In 2000, the TVPRA became the first federal law to
address crimes of human
specifically and comprehensively
trafficking.10 9
A. FinancialBenefit Provisions
Congress passed the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008110 with the purpose of
"enhanc[ing] measures to combat trafficking in persons."1 1 Specific
provisions in the 2008 reauthorization criminalize benefitting
financially from human trafficking, enhance civil liability for TVPRA
violations, and expand courts' jurisdiction over crimes committed under
the TVPRA.1 1 2 If a corporation uses labor provided by force, harm,
abuse, or fear or benefits financially from labor recruited in these

forum non conveniens can make prosecuting a suit under the ATS difficult); Williams, supra note
49, at 750-51.
107. See Pierce, supra note 51, at 594-95 (acknowledging the TVPRA's direct application to
trafficking crimes).
108. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-97 (2012).
109. Id.; Aguirre v. Best Care Agency, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 427, 442-43 (E.D.N.Y. 2013);
PolarisProject-TraffickingVictims' ProtectionAct (TVPA)--Fact Sheet, supra note 10.
110. Aguirre, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 459; 154 CONG. REC. S10,945-01 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2008).
111. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). The TVPRA lacks retroactive application, and it has a tenyear statute of limitations, except in circumstances where the victim was a minor when the
violation occurred, where the statute of limitations runs ten years from the date the victim turns
eighteen. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c); see Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2011); Adhikari
v. Daoud & Partners, 994 F. Supp. 2d 831, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2014), reh'g denied, 2015 WL 1387941
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-20225 (5th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015); Aguirre, 961 F.
Supp. 2d at 443 (citing Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.2d 308, 325 (2d Cir. 2012)); Camayo v. John Peroulis
& Sons Sheep, Inc., No. 10-cv-00772, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106714, at *4 (D. Colo.July 30, 2013).
The ten-year statute of limitations was added in 2008. Bang, supra note 57, at 1077 (citing 18
U.S.C. § 1595(c) (2006 & Supp. 2008)).
112. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1596 (2012); Polaris Project-Trafficking Victims' Protection Act
(TVPA)-Fact Sheet, supra note 10.
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conditions, the corporation violates both the criminal and civil
113
provisions of the TVPRA.
Financially benefitting from trafficked labor, even without
perpetrating the crime, is illegal under § 1589 of the TVPRA ("criminal
provision"):114
Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from
participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or
services by any of the means described in subsection (a), knowing or in reckless disregard
of the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or obtaining of
labor or services
1 15
by any of such means, shall be punished as provided in subsection (d).

Including criminal liability for knowingly benefitting from human
trafficking expands the reach of the law beyond actors that traffic
laborers to those "up the chain of command. . . who may profit from the
venture." 116 The TVPRA defines "venture" as "any group of two or more
17
individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity."'
The criminal provision has a civil parallel in § 1595 ("civil
provision"), which imposes civil liability against a perpetrator or anyone
who knowingly benefits from participation in a venture in violation of
the TVPRA sections against Peonage, Slavery, and Trafficking in
Persons.11 8 Subsection (a) of the civil provision almost mirrors the
language of the criminal provision regarding financial benefit:
113. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1593, 1595. Force, fraud, or coercion sufficient for a claim under the
TVPRA may include verbal or physical threats or assaults, the deceptive promise of employment,
or threats of deportation. Camayo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136100, at *13-15; Shuvalova v.
Cunningham, No. C 10-02159 RS, 2010 WL 5387770, at *7-10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010). As
corporations have legal personhood under U.S. law, the TVPRA can apply to corporations as well
as individuals. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 59, at 136 ("In fact, in most respects a
corporation will be granted the same legal rights and responsibilities as would any person.").
114. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595. See Pierce, supra note 51, at 586 ('Thus, under [the 2008]
reauthorization, even someone who does not act to further the trafficking but merely consciously
benefits from its existence is liable.").
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act § 222. Language that focuses on financial benefit was also used in 18 U.S.C. § 1593A: "Whoever
knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value" from a venture that is a violation
of the provisions against peonage or unlawful conduct with respect to documents to further forced
labor "knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the venture has engaged in such violation"
is punishable. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1592, 1593A, 1595 (2012).
116. POLARIS PROJECT, The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008. Summary of Important Provisions, WYNN CONSULTING 7,
http://www.markwynn.com/trafficking/the-william-wilberforce-trafficking-victims-protectionreauthorization-act-of-2008.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) [http://perma.cc/2D5H.QVNC].
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(5) (2012). Nothing indicates that this definition is not consistent
throughout the TVPRA. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595 (using the term "venture" but not giving a
specific definition).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1595; Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that
the civil liability created in 18 U.S.C. § 1595 could not be retroactively applied to conduct that
occurred prior to its effective date); see im, supranote 9, at 280 (stating that understanding how
the civil provision works requires an understanding of its criminal parallel).
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An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against
the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of
value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has
court of the United
engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district
1
States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees. 19

Application of the TVPRA to a corporation can have a significant
financial impact.120 Section 1593 grants financial restitution of at least
the measure of the value of victims' services and labor to victims, which
can be measured by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 121 Punitive damages
122
and attorneys' fees are also available under the statute.
B. Jurisdictionof the TVPRA
Courts have broad extraterritorial jurisdiction for trafficking
offenses under the TVPRA; since the passage of the 2008 TVPRA,
Congress has clearly intended the TVPRA to have international
application. 123 Section 1596 grants courts jurisdiction over TVPRA
violations: "[T]he courts of the United States have extra-territorial
jurisdiction over any offense (or any attempt or conspiracy to commit an
offense) [of the TVPRA] if-(1) an alleged offender is a national of the
United States ...

,"124 Relying on legislative history, district courts

119. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). If a criminal and civil suit are filed based on the same occurrence,
the civil suit will be stayed until the final trial court adjudication of the criminal action. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595(b)(1).
120. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1593 (2012) (creating mandatory restitution for a violation under the
TVPRA). There is a fine imposed on anyone who knowingly benefits from trafficked labor under §
1593A of the TVPRA. 18 U.S.C. § 1593A; Pierce, supra note 51, at 586.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1593; Carazani v. Zegarra, 972 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15-16, 24-27 (D.D.C. 2013)
(discussing how liability under the TVPRA can also include emotional distress and punitive
damages); Shuvalova v. Cunningham, No. C 10-02159 RS, 2010 WL 5387770, *11-14 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 22, 2010); see also Dryhurst, supra note 102, at 667 ("Criminal restitution is limited to the
economic loss of the complaining witness, which is limited to lost wages and direct expenses such
as medical costs, necessary transportation, temporary housing, childcare expenses, lost income,
attorney's fees, and other costs incurred.").
122. Ditullio, 662 F.3d at 1096-98; Pierce, supra note 51, at 585.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1596 (2012). Proposed legislation may affect this statute. Further, the
Congressional record establishes, "Trafficking in persons substantially affects interstate and
foreign commerce." H.R. Rep. 106-939, at 4 (2000) (Conf. Rep.). One court in the Eastern District
of New York discussed the purpose of the law, stating, "While the legislative history of the TVPA
undoubtedly focuses primarily on the need to combat international sex trafficking, the
Congressional purpose and findings of the TVPA make clear the intended broad scope of the
legislation." United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), vacated, 538 F.3d
97, rev'd, 560 U.S. 258, aff'd in part, vacated in part, 628 F.3d 36 (2d. Cir. 2010).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1596; POLARIS PROJECT, supra note 116, at 8. In 2007, the Southern District
of Indiana declared that § 1589 did not apply extraterritorially but that, "[ihf Congress wants to
impose such liability, it knows how to do so." Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1003
(S.D. Ind. 2007). One year later, Congress did. 18 U.S.C. § 1596. Although § 1595 is not explicitly
mentioned in the provisions for which § 1596 grants jurisdiction, at least one court has held that
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have interpreted the scope of the TVPRA broadly, emphasizing that the
125
Act is meant to deter trafficking both domestically and globally.
Courts may have personal jurisdiction over a corporation where the
corporation has its headquarters in or does business in the United
States.126
The scope of the statute reflects the scope of the crime; labor
trafficking is a borderless crime with repercussions in countries beyond
where the trafficking takes place. 12 7 Courts have rejected the argument
that § 1596 should be construed to limit application of the TVPRA to
only circumstances where a victim is trafficked into the United States,
saying, "[T]he thrust of the TVPRA would be severely undermined by a
holding that U.S. defendants who gained commercial advantage in this
country through engaging in illegal human trafficking were free from
liability, so long as the trafficking acts themselves took place outside of
1 28
American borders."
However, there are limitations to jurisdiction over foreign events
that may restrict the application of the TVPRA. For example, a
prosecutor may not bring a case if a foreign government is already
prosecuting the defendant for the same conduct.1 29 Where a foreign
country is involved, the case may be dismissed for forum non
conveniens, which applies if there is a more adequate or appropriate

the same jurisdiction is extended to the civil provision as the criminal provision. Adhikari v. Daoud
& Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 682-84 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
125. Aguilera v. Aegis Commc'ns Grp., LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 975, 977-79 (W.D. Mo. 2014)
(citing HR Conf. Rep. 106-939, at 1 (2000)); Nunag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790
F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 2011)). The presumption against extraterritoriality does not
apply to the TVPRA because Congress did offer clear intent. 18 U.S.C. § 1596; BRADLEY &
GOLDSMITH, supranote 78, at 93 (citing Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244 (1991)) ("Our conclusion today is buttressed by the fact that 'when it desires to do so,
Congress knows how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute.' ").
126. JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 147.
127. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012) ("Trafficking in persons is a transnational crime with
national implications."); Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F.Supp.2d 674, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2009)
("[H]uman trafficking is by nature an 'international' crime; it is difficult clearly to delineate those
trafficking acts which are truly 'extraterritorial' and those which sufficiently reach across U.S.
borders."); TIP Report 2015, supra note 23, at 13 ("Human trafficking has no boundaries and
respects no laws.").
128. Aguilera, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 977-79 (citing HR Conf. Rep. 106-939, at 1 (2000)); Adhikari,
697 F. Supp. 2d at 683.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1596(b). This jurisdictional limitation does not explain whether suit may be
brought where an international subsidiary is being sued in a local court but plaintiffs seek to sue
the parent company, a major U.S. corporation, in U.S. courts. See Thompson et al., supra note 79,
at 873 (discussing the complexity in international law where the entity that violates the law is a
subsidiary in one country but the parent corporation is a multinational corporation headquartered
in a different country).
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forum to hear the case;1 30 or the court may choose not to apply the
31
TVPRA if there are choice-of-law issues.
C. Mens Rea and Evidentiary Burdens of the TVPRA
Prosecutors must prove two mens rea elements to establish a
violation of the criminal provision: (1) that the defendant knowingly
benefitted from the venture and (2) that the defendant knew or was in
reckless disregard of the fact that the venture relied upon forced
labor. 3 2 Several factors indicate whether a corporation or individual
should have known trafficking violations may exist, including terms of
a contract agreement, separation of a division of the labor force, lack of
competing suppliers with equally low costs, and promises of immigrant
visas. 133 The TVPRA therefore has a wide scope; a defendant
corporation can be liable under the statute without directly
contributing to the force, fraud, or coercion if it recklessly disregarded
134
trafficking in its supply chain that provided a financial benefit.
To maintain a civil action under the TVPRA, a plaintiff must
establish facts by a preponderance of the evidence. 135 This standard
requires that the plaintiff prove that the alleged facts more likely than
not occurred. 36 While the civil liability provision creates an avenue for
victims of trafficking to pursue civil liability, these cases are more often
brought on behalf of victims by "human rights advocates, lawyers, law
school students and professors."' 37 A civil case allows victims and
victims' advocates to initiate their own cases, bring cases that
prosecutors may be unwilling to bring, receive damages in accordance
with the harms suffered, and receive damages from injuries that may
38
not have enough evidence to result in criminal punishment.
130. Jack H. Friedenthal, Arthur R. Miller, John E. Sexton & Helen Hershkoff, Civil
Procedure 348 (9th ed. 2005); JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 72, 87-88.
131. JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 74-76.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2012). These same mens rea elements apply to the fine levied under §
1593A, the section which creates a fine for violations of the civil provision. 18 U.S.C. § 1593A
(2012).
133. Infra Section IV.A.i; see Bang, supra note 57, at 1085-92; Bang, supra note 26, at 298
(describing the importance of contract terms).
134. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595 (2012); George & Smith, supra note 64, at 91 (citing Pierce, supra
note 51, at 586).
135. United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 241-44 (2d Cir. 2010); Aguirre v. Best Care
Agency, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 427, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1589); Shukla v. Sharma,
No. 07-CV-2972, 2012 WL 481796, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012).
136. Preponderance,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014).
137. Bang, supra note 2, at 264.
138. Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 5, at 15-18. The civil burden of proof is lower than the
burden of proof required under the criminal provision, "beyond a reasonable doubt," which means
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D. Use of the TVPRA in Litigation to Date
In its summary of the 2008 TVPRA, the Polaris Project, a
prominent anti-human trafficking organization, predicted, "If these
[financial benefit] provisions are robustly implemented, they will
ultimately result in transfers of trafficker wealth to their victims and
will increase the financial risks of engaging in trafficking." 139 However,
robust implementation has not yet occurred due to prosecutors and
litigators bringing only a scarcity of cases, despite high estimates
regarding the number of victims of trafficking. 140
Since its passage in 2000 and the addition of a civil remedy in
2003, the TVPRA in general has failed to achieve its potential as a tool
for sweeping trafficking accountability. 141 According to Martina E.
Vandenberg, founder and president of the Human Trafficking Pro Bono
Legal Center, since the civil provision was added in 2003, only 141 civil
cases have claimed forced labor under the TVPRA (an average of less
than twelve cases per year). 142 Further, she states, "Of the total 152
cases [filed under the civil provision of the TVPRA], 87 include
corporate entities as defendants. Most of these corporate entities are
labor recruiters, who are in large part responsible for the abuses in the
labor supply chain." 143 Labor recruiters work on the "frontlines" of
trafficking and may be distinct from the actual beneficiaries of the

that it is possible for a victim to win a case under § 1595 even though the facts are not strong
enough to win under § 1589. See Beyond a reasonabledoubt, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1373, 1457
(10th ed. 2014). Civil evidence rules also are more favorable to victims of trafficking than criminal
evidence rules because they allow evidence of psychological conditions. Kim & Hreshchyshyn,
supra note 5, at 17.
7;
About, POLARIS PROJECT,
116,
at
supra note
PROJECT,
139. POLARIS
https://polarisproject.org/about (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) [perma.cc/26JM-WRU4] ("Polaris is a
leader in the global fight to eradicate modern slavery.").
140. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (estimating the number of trafficked victims
in the world today); Pierce, supra note 51, at 578 (explaining that few trafficking cases are ever
prosecuted).
141. See Bang, supra note 57, at 1050-51; Bang, supra note 2, at 264; Wheaton, et al., supra
note 24, at 126 ('[W]ith only a few hundred federal prosecutions since January 2001, [as of 2010]
the TVPA has had little impact on human traffickers in the United States.").
142. Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 13; Leadership, THE HUMAN TRAFFICKING PRO BONO
LEGAL CENTER, http://www.htprobono.org/about-us/leadership/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016); Current
Federal Laws, supra note 3. According to Human Rights First, "From 2001 to 2008, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices prosecuted 531 defendants under the
TVPA, secured 518 convictions and guilty pleas, and opened 1,005 new investigations.... In 2014,
the U.S. Government pursued 208 cases and obtained 184 convictions." Corporate Liability and
Human Trafficking, sipranote 1, at 2.
143. Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 13.
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labor. 144 Civil litigators have used the financial benefit provisions of the
2008 TVPRA even less frequently-as of February 2016 only 45twenty1
five published cases even cited the financial benefit provision.
If victims are unaware of their legal rights, incapable of leaving
their workplace, and fearful of law enforcement, they are unlikely to
bring forth cases on their own behalf. 146 Some victims may also face
language barriers, fear of retaliation by traffickers, and psychological
barriers and therefore be unwilling to bring a case. 147 Victims lack the
means to afford proper legal representation, and traffickers may lack
the ability to pay damages.' 48 Therefore, the use of the TVPRA is
dependent on concerned parties to take up victims' cases on their behalf
in order to obtain justice. Activists are growing more aware of this call
to action. 149 In January 2015 the White House hosted a discussion on
eliminating supply-chain trafficking, and in May 2015 lawyers in
London met to discuss how to best use strategic litigation as a tool to
fight trafficking crimes.' 50 Because the TVPRA authorizes a court to
provide attorneys' fees, activists may be more willing to bring a case for
15
an indigent plaintiff. '
One commentator has suggested so few cases have been brought
due to the difficulty of finding victims and of victims self-identifying and
wishing to go forward with a case. 152 Further, there may have been a
lack of investment in these cases, and victims themselves are unable to

144. Wheaton, et al., supra note 24, at 127, 136 (explaining the recruiter may be on the
frontlines of trafficking as opposed to the destination, or in some circumstances the trafficker and
employer may be the same individual).
145. Supra note 51; see also Nam, supra note 24, at 1668 (noting the "infrequent utiliz[ation]"
of § 1589).
146. See Bang, supra note 2, at 264; see also HAUGEN & BOUTROS, supra note 32, at 73-74
(explaining victims' fear to seek help from law enforcement).
147. Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 5, at 15; see also HR Conf. Rep. 106-939, at 1 (2000):
Because victims of trafficking are frequently unfamiliar with the laws, cultures, and
languages of the countries into which they have been trafficked, because they are often
subject to coercion and intimidation including physical detention and debt bondage, and
because they often fear retribution and forcible removal to countries in which they will
face retribution or other hardship, these victims often find it difficult or impossible to
report the crimes committed against them or to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of such crimes.
148. See Bang, supra note 2, at 264 (describing barriers victims face when seeking legal
remedies).
149. See Vandenberg, supranote 17, at 3; Amy Pope, CombatingHuman Trafficking in Supply
Chains, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 29, 2015, 5:07 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
2015/01/29/combating-human-trafficking-supply-chains [https://perma.cc/J3CH-NJ3K].
150. Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 3; Pope, supra note 149.
151. See Pierce, supra note 51, at 585 (noting that the TVPRA provides for attorneys' fees).
152. Nam, supra note 24, at 1678, 1687.
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fund civil litigation costs. 153 Finally, perhaps due to the limited use thus
far, litigators may not know the best strategies for bringing cases or
154
even what kind of cases to bring.
The cases that litigators have brought under the civil liability
provision of the TVPRA to date are scarce.1 55 In a notable case, David
v. Signal International,the plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss and
ultimately won a jury verdict when they filed suit under the civil
provision of the TVPRA alleging recruitment based on false premises,
the creation of substantial debt, and the requirement to work until the
debt was paid. 156 These plaintiffs were Indian citizens who were
subjected to the terrible conditions described at the beginning of this
1 57
Note.
In another example, Aguilera v. Aegis Communications Group,
a plaintiff pled sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss when she
alleged she worked long hours for her employer in poor conditions and
was told that if she left her job, her employers would not pay for her
return flight home from India to the United States as planned.1 5 8 In
Aguirre v. Best Care Agency, Inc., the plaintiff survived a motion for
summary judgment when she alleged her employers paid her less than
she was promised and threatened to remove their sponsorship for her
employment visa petition if she quit working.159 Because the
defendants, as the two owners of the corporation, would have benefitted
financially from the plaintiffs employment, the court decided that the
plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the defendants knowingly benefitted
160
under the TVPRA.

153. See Bang, supra note 2, at 264 (noting attorneys may not be eager to take these cases);
Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 2 ("[H]igh impact investment has the potential to reap enormous
dividends in the fight to end impunity and secure justice .... "); supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
154. See Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 3, 6 (noting the importance of lawyers sharing past
experiences and describing the choices litigators must make in bringing trafficking cases).
155. See Nam, supranote 24, at 1668 (suggesting the TVPRA has not been utilized enough).
156. 37 F. Supp. 3d 822, 831-33 (E.D. La. 2014); Vandenberg, supranote 17, at 7; Finn, supra
note 31. Plaintiffs voluntarily dropped their § 1590 claim and left only the § 1589 claim. David v.
Signal Int'l, LLC, No. 08-1220, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1482, at *198 n.1 (E.D. La., Jan. 6, 2015).
157. David, 37 F. Supp. 3d at 824; supra Part I.
158. Aguilera v. Aegis Commc'ns Grp., 72 F. Supp. 3d 975, 976 (W.D. Mn. 2014).
159. Aguirre v. Best Care Agency, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 427, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
160. Id. at 460-61.
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IV. A NEW APPROACH TO TRAFFICKING LIABILITY: CRIMINAL, CIVIL,
AND FIDUCIARY LIABILITY UNDER THE TVPRA
Since activists already use litigation as a tool for corporate
accountability and the legal landscape is constantly changing,
corporations should alter their business practices to minimize liability
in response to new legislation. The financial benefit provision of the
2008 TVPRA poses a greater risk of liability than did prior labor
regulations to corporations that fail to alter practices when their
suppliers are committing trafficking violations. To comply with their
fiduciary duty to make informed decisions in good faith, corporate
directors should be aware of how the TVPRA can be applied to
corporations with labor trafficking in their supply chains and how the
TVPRA may see expanded use in the future. 6 1 Corporations may then
be required to put greater pressure on their suppliers to eliminate
trafficking from their labor force or to terminate supplier contracts in
order to minimize their own liability risk.
Activists, victims, and prosecutors have underused the TVPRA
since its passage in 2000, but greater emphasis on holding corporations
accountable through litigation may result in more plaintiffs bringing
cases under the TVPRA and judges developing a greater understanding
of its application. 62 Just as the ATS lay dormant until 1980, when
activists recognized the potential application of the statute, so activists
163
may reinvigorate the TVPRA with application to corporations.
Whereas under the ATS a human rights violation occurring abroad
brought by a foreign plaintiff against a supplier would need a theory of
vicarious liability or aiding and abetting to reach a U.S. parent
corporation, the financial benefit provision of the TVPRA eclipses the
164
need for these more complicated legal theories.
Trafficking is an economic problem with economic motivations,
and when trafficking laws are not enforced, corporations and
161. E.g., In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("Where a director in fact
exercises a good faith effort to be informed and to exercise appropriate judgment, he or she should
be deemed to satisfy fully the duty of attention.").
162. See Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 8 (encouraging lawyers, NGOs, journalists, and others
to use strategic litigation to fight human trafficking); Bang, supra note 57, at 1050 ("A surprisingly
small number of trafficking cases have been filed in federal district courts, and few of those cases
involve the overseas global corporate supply contracting system.").
163. Between 1789 and 1980, only twenty-one ATS cases were brought. See Stephens, supra
note 71, at 181-82, 181 n. 11 (explaining that prior to Filartigav. Pena-Irala,only twenty-one cases
were brought under the ATS). After Filartigain 1980, this number increased dramatically. Id. at
184-85 (approximately eighty cases were filed between 1980 and 2004 relying on the ATS).
164. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595; Corporate Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1,
at 8-9 (describing a slavery case brought under the ATS under a theory of aiding and abetting);
supra Part II (discussing limitations of the ATS).
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individuals profit from forced labor without facing the costs of their
behavior. 165 When returns are high and risks of actual punishment are
low, corporations stand to gain financially from the use of trafficked
labor. 66 However, steep litigation costs or reputational damage could
effectively negate this potential financial gain.167 Strong legal
enforcement both criminally and civilly can decrease the demand side
of trafficking economics. 168 By complying with the TVPRA and striving
to eliminate trafficking from its supply chain, a corporation absorbs the
costs of negative externalities produced by trafficked labor and reduces
its likelihood of liability and reputational costs based on human
169
trafficking violations.
A. TVPRA as a Legal Basis for Corporate Criminaland Civil Liability
As of 2008, the TVPRA is unique compared to other laws because
the financial benefits provision creates liability for entities distinct from
the actual perpetrators of the crime without requiring an agency
relationship. 170 Because the TVPRA's financial benefits provisions have
not yet been applied to a large corporation, activists, judges, and
lawyers may lack a general understanding of how to apply the language
171
of the criminal and civil provisions to traffickers' actions.
1. Financial Benefit Provision Applied to Corporations
Professor Naomi Bang has proposed using an "economic realities
test" for determining whether joint employment exists for purposes of
applying the TVPRA to corporations that financially benefit from
human trafficking.1 72 Bang's proposal is that the economic realities test,
as currently applied to the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair
165. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
166. Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 5, at 7 ("Trafficking has a high return-to-risk ratio that
makes it more attractive to criminals than other, riskier criminal activities.").
167. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
168. See generally Jonathan Todres, The Private Sector's Pivotal Role in Combating Human
Trafficking, 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 80, 85 (2012), http://www.californialawreview.org/wp.
content/uploads/2014/10/The-Private-Sector-s-Pivotal-Role-in-Combating-Human-Trafficking.pdf
("Tackling demand side issues will require addressing... the attendant pressure on businesses to
constantly increase profits.").
169. See Morrissey, supra note 62, at 387 (explaining that the corporate focus on quick profits
can result in negative externalities on society).
170. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595; Pierce, supranote 51, at 578-79 (explaining that plaintiffs
face difficulties in establishing corporate liability where there is a subcontractor).
171. See generally Nam, supra note 24, at 1656 ("[Tlrafficking victims have filed very few
lawsuits under this civil remedy [§ 1595] ... since its creation .... "); supra note 51.
172. Bang, supra note 57, at 1085-87; Bang, supra note 2, at 258-59, 277-96, 308-09.
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Labor Standards Act, could be a mechanism to link the corporation to
the acts of the supplier. 173 A theory of joint employment enables courts
to look beyond the immediate perpetrator of the crime to the corporation
174
that may have a great deal of control over the perpetrator entity.
Bang proposes this test be applied to effectively prosecute corporations
under the first subsection of the criminal provision of the TVPRA,
§ 1589(a), which criminalizes anyone who obtains or provides forced
labor through force, harm, abuse, or fraud.175
However, a test to prove joint employment in order for the law
to reach a parent corporation is unnecessary given the explicit language
of the financial benefit provision of the 2008 TVPRA. 176 The language
of the 2008 TVPRA provides this legal connection between the supplier
and the corporation because it encompasses anyone that benefits from
participation in a venture. 177 The language of the 2008 TVPRA eclipses
the need for complicated legal theories of vicarious liability or joint
employment to hold corporations accountable for actions of their
suppliers under § 1589(a), since the remedy for both § 1589(a) and (b),
the financial benefits subsection of the criminal provision, are the
78
same.1
Although the application of the economic realities test is
unnecessary due to the financial benefits provision, the factors
Professor Bang mentions to determine the legal relationship between
the supplier, its employees, and the corporation are relevant to
determine what constitutes corporate knowledge or reckless disregard
under the TVPRA. 179 Under the economic-realities-test theory,
corporations could be held accountable under the TVPRA for trafficking
in supply chains based on the terms of the corporate supply contract

173. See Bang, supra note 57, at 1089-91 ("The economic realities test provides a solid
framework and a legally sound nexus tying the foreign contractor to the corporation."); see also
Bang, supra note 2, at 258-59 (suggesting a strong link between the TVPRA and FLSA).
174. See Bang, supra note 2, at 279-82 (arguing the joint employment doctrine is vital to
prevent companies from avoiding liability).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 1589; Bang, supra note 2, at 311.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b).
177. See id. (outlining those who can be held responsible for benefitting by participating in a
venture).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 1593 (requiring mandatory restitution for any offense under the chapter,
which includes § 1589); see also Bang, supra note 2, at 275 ("Satisfying this central requirement
of 'control' of the corporation over its contractors is particularly challenging in overseas trafficking
cases ... ").
179. See Bang, supra note 57, at 1085-92 (mentioning terms of the supply contract and the
contractor's dependency on the corporation as relevant to application of the economic realities
test); see also supra Section III.C. (discussing mens rea as applied to the TVPRA).
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and the contractor's ability to negotiate terms of the supply contract to
80
determine the workers' dependence.
For example, if examined closely, supply-contract terms may
indicate the labor conditions of a supplier.18 1 While relevant for the joint
employer test, contract terms also give notice to a corporation to be
skeptical about true working conditions.18 2 Considering how many
workers are on staff, how much they are paid, and what their rate of
production is may indicate whether the labor costs meet a reasonable
wage or reasonable number of hours worked. Red flags may also include
reports of concern from NGOs or media outlets.18 3 If there were
trafficking in the workforce of a supplier but nothing hinted about the
actual conditions to the corporation, a corporation would not be on
notice of potential TVPRA violations, and there would be insufficient
evidence for reckless disregard of trafficking, absent other factors.
A courts' determination of what constitutes a "benefit" sufficient
to trigger liability will likely need to be a case-by-case evaluation.8 4 The
language used in both the criminal and civil provisions of the TVPRA"benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value"-has been
interpreted in the context of a different section of the TVPRA as
covering both monetary and non-monetary value.18 5 Until courts decide
more TVPRA cases on the merits and establish precedent for what
degree of benefit results in liability or culpability, corporations should
be wary of the liability risk from any degree of reduced costs they profit
from by relying on suppliers that use forced labor.

180. See Bang, supra note 57, at 1089-91 (highlighting the importance of the supply contract
and dependency of the contractor); see also Bang, supra note 2, at 300-02 (same).
181. See Bang, supra note 2, at 298 ("[C]ontract terms concerning price and deadlines are the
factors forming the crux of the economic realities test.").
182. See Bang, supra note 57, at 1089-91 ("With the supply contract provisions as proof of
working conditions, big name corporations cannot feign ignorance of the margin left to pay for the
soft costs of labor, benefits, safety measures, and other unexpected costs.").
183. See Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int'l v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 983 (2013) ("One way that the
plaintiff may plead such a conscious failure to monitor is to identify 'red flags,' obvious and
problematic occurrences .... ).
184. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2012) (giving no indication of what constitutes financial benefit);
see also Bang, supra note 57, at 1083-91 (explaining the five factors considered in determining
application of the economic realities test to date and the proposed factors to be considered in
applying the test to the trafficking context).
185. United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2014) (describing receipt of
auditioning fees and ownership of copies of porn videos as benefits); United States v. Cook, No. 1000244-02-CR-W-DW, 2013 WL 3039296, at *12-13 (W.D. Mo. June 17, 2013) (describing ownership
of something for which people will pay money, faster file downloading, or expectation of a sexual
encounter as things of value in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)).
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2. Hypothetical Application
With its broad language, the TVPRA can hold corporations
accountable for a wider range of activities than previous human rights
laws have done. 18 6 The case Doe v. Unocal Corp.18 7 involves a set of facts
that today could give rise to a violation of the TVPRA's financial benefit
provisions. Unocal was brought in 1997 and settled in 2004, prior to the
addition of the financial benefits provisions of the 2008 TVPRA.18 8 In
this case, the defendant corporation financially benefitted from
trafficked labor but did not directly perpetrate the trafficking
violation.189
Unocal involved the construction of an oil pipeline and
allegations that the military hired for security was responsible for
terrible human rights abuses. 19 Both Unocal Corporation and Total
S.A. set up subsidiaries1 9 1 with an interest in the pipeline project, and
the two corporations met to discuss security issues and concerns about
the amount of force the Myanmar military may use in providing project
security. 192 Unocal executives found no indications of human rights
violations in the project in 1994, but individuals from Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International informed Unocal in 1995 that forced
labor was a major concern. 193 Also in 1995, a Unocal consultant reported
that forced labor was occurring. 19 4 Under the TVPRA, warnings from
prominent human rights organizations may be sufficient to put a
corporation on notice of the likely existence of labor trafficking in the
195
supply chain.

186. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595 (2012).
187. 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
188. Id. Unocal has a complicated procedural history: "The case was dismissed by [Judge Lew]
in 2000 .... but reinstated by the Ninth Circuit in 2002 ....That decision was vacated [in] 2003,
and [Judge Lew's] decision reinstated, pending an appeal to an eleven[-]judge en banc panel within
the Ninth Circuit." JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 68 (footnotes omitted). The parties settled in 2004.
2004),
14,
(Dec.
TIMES
N.Y.
in Myanmar,
Suit
Rights
Settles
Unocal
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/14fbusiness/unocal-settles-rights-suit-in-myanmar.html
[http://perma.cc/ATP7-C3HT].
189. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
190. JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 68-69.
191. These subsidiaries were named Unocal Myanmar Offshore Company ("UMOC"), Unocal
International Pipeline Corporation, and Total Myanmar Exploration and Production ('TMEP"),
respectively. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2002); Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at
1297-98.
192. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1298-99.
193. Id. at 1299-1302; Unocal, 395 F.3d at 941.
194. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1299-1300; Unocal, 395 F.3d at 941.
195. See Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int'l v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 983 (2013) (describing the
importance of responding to red flags).
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The plaintiffs, a class of resident farmers of a particular area in
Myanmar, asserted that defendant corporations Unocal and Total S.A.
knew that violence and fear were tools used by the local military junta
96
to assist in the defendant corporations' creation of a pipeline.1
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that "defendants Unocal and Total
were aware of and benefitted from, and continue to be aware of and
benefit from, the use of forced labor to support the Yadana gas pipeline
project."1 97 One alleged benefit from the reliance on trafficked labor, the
plaintiffs claimed, was that the corporations gained an "unfair
competitive advantage in the United States gas market."19 8 Although
"benefit" from forced labor has yet to be sufficiently established with
case law, benefit from competitive advantage alone would likely be
sufficient to constitute a benefit under the TVPRA because it has
value. 199
A similar set of facts today could result in corporate liability
under the financial benefit provision of the TVPRA. The corporation
was part of a venture that knowingly financially benefitted from forced
labor in the construction of the pipeline. 20 0 In fact, the trial court stated,
"The evidence does suggest that Unocal knew that forced labor was
being utilized and that the Joint Venturers benefitted from the
practice." 20 1 Under the TVPRA, this knowledge of the benefit from a
venture that the corporation knew was perpetrating human trafficking
violations would be sufficient to allege a violation of the criminal and
civil provisions of the TVPRA. 20 2 Unocal did not have any specific desire
that the security forces rely on trafficked labor, but this is not enough
20 3
to avoid liability under the TVPRA.
Corporations can no longer ignore red flags, such as reports from
human rights groups or other third parties, that human rights
196. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883, 888.
197. Id. at 885 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 888. This claim was part of an argument that the defendants' actions had a direct
effect in the United States for an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
199. See notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
200. JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 71; Williams, supra note 49, at 758-61. In 1996, Total S.A.
sent Unocal a memorandum that demonstrated knowledge that labor trafficking violations had
occurred. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 ("In a September 17, 1996 memorandum from Total to
Unocal regarding forced labor, Total acknowledged that 'we were told that even if Total is not using
forced labor directly, the troops assigned to the protection of our operations use forced labor to
build their camps and to carry their equipments.' ").
201. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1310 (emphasis added).
202. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589, 1595 (2012).
203. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589, 1595 (no element regarding corporate intent that labor be derived
by force, fraud, or coercion); Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1310 ("In fact, the Joint Venturers
expressed concern that the Myanmar government was utilizing forced labor in connection with the
Project.").
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violations are occurring in connection with their business operations. 204
Directors should be wary of supplier relationships that once insulated
their corporation from liability-either because they were not liable or
because proof of liability required complicated legal theories-but that,
since 2008, now fit directly within the scope of the TVPRA.
B. TVPRA as a Legal Basis for CorporateDirectors'
FiduciaryLiability
The financial benefit provision of the 2008 TVPRA expands the
scope of potential liability to include more defendants. 205 Corporate
directors should monitor their suppliers' employment strategies in
order to fulfill corporate obligations to make good faith, informed
decisions in structuring policies to minimize liability risk. 20 6 If given
notice that a subsidiary is violating the laws against human trafficking,
20 7
a corporation must act.
1. Expansion of the Corporate Duty to Monitor
Directors have a general duty to have adequate reporting
systems in place to make informed decisions about the company. 208
However, with the expanded potential for corporate liability under the
2008 TVPRA, directors now have an expanded duty of informationgathering under the TVPRA, as now the labor practices of both the
209
supplier and the corporation affect the corporation's liability risk.
Because the 2008 TVPRA criminalizes benefitting financially from
204. See Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int'l v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 983 (2013) (describing the
importance of responding to red flags).
205. Dryhurst, supra note 102, at 661 ("Employer corporations most likely would be held
liable under the provision penalizing 'whoever knowingly benefits' from a venture engaged in labor
trafficking.").
206. See infra Section I.D.
207. See Fuqi Int'l, 66 A.3d at 984 ("When faced with knowledge that the company controls
are inadequate, the directors must act, i.e., they must prevent further wrongdoing from
occurring."); In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining that directors'
failure to take steps to remedy a violation of law they knew or should have known was occurring
is an element of proving a breach of duty); O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 59, at 265-66
(describing a "board's responsibility to monitor and prevent illegal activity").
208. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (explaining a director's failure to have an adequate
reporting system in place may make him or her liable for losses from legal non-compliance).
209. See supra Section 1V.A. A 2015 report by Human Rights First, a non-profit human rights
organization, raised the idea of director fiduciary obligations to monitor for human trafficking but
did not discuss these duties in the context of the TVPRA nor did it discuss how they applied in
practice. Corporate Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 18; About Us, HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, http://www.humanrightsfirst.orgabout (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) [perma.cc/WU6FEE6B].
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trafficking in addition to the direct perpetration of the crime, corporate
directors must have information regarding indicators of potential
trafficking violations not only in their own workforce but also in the
2 10
workforce of their suppliers.
Courts may no longer afford business-judgment-rule protection
to regulation systems that may have been acceptable prior to the
TVPRA's passage in 2000 and later expansions, in light of the greater
liability imposed for supply-chain trafficking under the TVPRA. If
necessary, directors must alter the corporate status quo of lax
regulation and inadequate monitoring of suppliers in order to comply
with fiduciary duties. 21 1 For example, if directors could once in good
faith ignore the implications from suppliers' contracts about labor
21 2
practices, now they should be alert to hints of trafficking.
Compliance with this higher degree of monitoring under the
TVPRA may require increased labor and supply costs as a corporation
alters its current practices. 2 13 Depending on the current state of a
corporation's monitoring procedures, compliance with fiduciary duties
arising out of the TVPRA may require improvements in a corporation's
monitoring structure and greater evaluation of members of the supply
chain, as discussed below. 21 4 However, these costs are necessary
because corporate directors have an affirmative duty to establish
adequate reporting systems to ensure director awareness of company
215
operations and activities to make informed decisions in good faith.

210. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595 (criminalizing and creating liability for financial benefit from
trafficked labor); Johnson, supra note 53, at 28, 33-35 (explaining that corporate lawyers should
care about trafficking in the supply chain). Williams and Conley have argued that corporate
directors have a fiduciary obligation "to be aware of human rights risks and potential violations
within a company's global operations and to develop policies and management procedures to
reduce the risks of such violations." Williams & Conley, supra note 69, at 81-94 (explaining
corporate liability under the ATS).
211. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (explaining that a board's lack of oversight or monitoring
and failure to have information systems in place could constitute a lack of good faith).
212. See supra Section III.C.
213. See Williams, supra note 49, at 737 (noting that Nike altered wages and safety
requirements as a reaction to negative publicity for poor labor conditions).
214. Infra Section IV.C; see Norman Bishara & David Hess, Human Rights and a
Corporation'sDuty to Combat Corruption, in LAW, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66,
at 71, 81, 85-89 (arguing for corporate due diligence with respect to corporate social responsibility);
Hiller & Hiller, supra note 66, at 118-22 (arguing for corporate due diligence under the United
Nations Framework for Business and Human Rights); Nersessian, supra note 49, at 1182 ('The
failure to take reasonable steps to prevent [human rights violations], or to properly investigate
reports of such violations by subsidiaries or agents, may constitute mismanagement and a
fiduciary breach.").
215. See, e.g., Williams & Conley, supra note 69, at 88:
After Sosa, human rights violations are part of the liability risks that directors need to
consider, at least to the extent of ensuring that the company has established
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Corporate directors should be aware of the state of human rights
laws and potential risks of liability in their corporation. 2 16 Directors
must be knowledgeable about human rights, as a director's fiduciary
duty of care requires understanding the risks and liability exposure of
the corporation, including those in the context of international human
rights. 21 7 From the very beginning of their relationship with suppliers,
directors and corporate officers should consider the need to be informed
about potential trafficking violations and implement safeguards such
as "a prohibition on the use of trafficked, forced, or child labor;
cooperation requirements; audit rights; and rights to suspend
performance, withhold payments, and terminate the contract if
violations are uncovered." 218 By implementing these safeguards,
directors indicate to suppliers that trafficking violations will not be
tolerated.
As social awareness of human trafficking has grown, so has
directors' need to recognize the problem and take action: "[W]here a
decade ago businesses might have been unaware that they reaped
economic benefits from enslaved labor, today the issue of human
trafficking is regularly in the news, making it much harder for any
individual or entity to profess ignorance. '2 19 Under the TVPRA, reckless
disregard of trafficking in the corporate supply chain is criminal
behavior and directors should be aware of and eliminate this risk of
220
liability to the corporation.

appropriate information and reporting systems to assess risks of human rights
violations, as well as policies to address conditions that may give rise to such risks.
216. See Kerr, supra note 68, at 835 ("[Tlhe duty of good faith may even require that directors
consider the social impact of their decisions in this current era of corporate responsibility.");
Corporate Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 25 (describing the importance of
understanding the laws against human trafficking).
217. See, e.g., Williams & Conley, supra note 69, at 88, 92.
218. See Brittany Prelogar et al., New Human Trafficking Laws and US Government
Initiatives Make Anti-Trafficking a Compliance Priority for Businesses in 2013, STEPTOE &
JOHNSON LLP (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-8618.html [perma.cc/7SBLJ9QH].
219. Todres, supra note 168, at 89-90. For example, CNN has created the CNN Freedom
Project, a webpage "to amplify the voices of the victims of modern-slavery, highlight success stories
and help unravel the tangle of criminal enterprises trading in human life." The CNN Freedom
Project, CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/specials/world/freedom-project (last visited Feb. 6, 2016)
[http://perma.cc/9LEV-SPUA]. The New York Times has a "Times Topics" page dedicated to
Human Trafficking that includes an entire chronology of the paper's coverage of human trafficking
stories, as well as links to general information about human trafficking. Human Trafficking, N.Y.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/h/
TIMES,
human trafficking/index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) [http://perma.cc/A29G-PFMV].
220. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2012).
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2. Shareholder Derivative Suits
Shareholders may bring a derivative suit for breach of fiduciary
duty against the directors of a corporation who fail to effectively monitor
their suppliers' labor conditions for the presence of human trafficking if
that failure results in loss to the company. 221 In other areas of the law,
follow-on derivative suits have become an anticipated response to
222
litigation for a company's failure to comply with the law.
Additionally, scholars have encouraged more shareholder activism to
exert greater oversight of corporate governance. 22 3 The chances of
double liability or even triple liability for human trafficking violations
(if both a criminal and civil suit were brought under the TVPRA and
shareholders brought a derivative suit) could result in steep costs for
the corporation and directors who failed to eliminate trafficking from
the corporate supply chain. So far, no case has been brought as a
22 4
shareholder derivative suit citing the TVPRA.
With a derivative suit, shareholders assert wrongs done to the
corporation on behalf of the corporation. 22 5 To effectively bring a
derivative suit in Delaware, shareholders must first make demand or
prove demand futility.226 To plead demand futility, shareholders may
221. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (outlining the requirements for shareholders to bring a derivative
suit in federal court); see also Joseph M. McLaughlin, Shareholder Derivative Litigation, PRAC. L.
(2015), http://us.practicallaw.com/8-508-8277 [perma.cc/QM58-8Z7J]. Depending on where the suit
is brought, the shareholders may need to first fulfill the demand requirement by informing the
directors of what claims they have and give the directors an opportunity to first bring the claim.
O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 59, at 325. If the directors do not pursue the claim,
"shareholder[s] may challenge the directors' decision as a breach of fiduciary duty, but [they] have
no right to directly pursue the original claim that was the subject of [their] demand." Id. at 325. If
demand is futile, shareholders may not have to make demand prior to bringing a derivative action.
Id. at 325-26.
222. Gabriela Jara, Note, Following on the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct: The Dynamic
ShareholderDerivative Suit, 63 DUKE L.J. 199, 201-02 (2013) (noting that follow-on derivative
suits often follow allegations of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations).
223. See Morrissey, supra note 62, at 373-74 (discussing approaches from academics on how
increased shareholder rights can guard against managerial misconduct).
224. In addition to broad corporate liability, directors should consider how the TVPRA might
be used against individuals if the corporate veil is pierced. Piercing the corporate veil is a legal
device that allows plaintiffs to bring a case against individuals of the corporation in circumstances
of crimes or injustice, in effect removing the shield that the corporate entity normally provides.
O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supranote 59, at 501-02. Prosecuting individual directors may serve the
same deterrent function as a suit against the corporation due to the indemnification clauses most
corporations have. Thompson et al., supra note 79, at 872-73.
225. See Jara, supra note 222, at 201 (explaining that in derivative suits, the injury is an
injury to the corporation).
226. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 366-67 (Del. 2006). See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supranote
59, at 325 (noting that requirements for demand and demand futility vary in different
jurisdictions); Jara, supranote 222, at 209-13 (explaining the demand requirement). Shareholders
can allege demand futility for both board action and inaction under the Aronson v. Lewis test and
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argue that directors allowed poor oversight of trafficking violations in
the labor force of suppliers, which allowed the corporation to illegally
financially benefit from trafficking, or that they ignored red flags that
should have given them knowledge. 227 In the Caremark litigation, in
order to prove a derivative claim that directors breached their duty,
plaintiffs had to prove: "(1) that the directors knew or (2) should have
known that violations of law were occurring and, in either event, (3)
that the directors took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or
remedy that situation, and (4) that such failure proximately resulted in
2 28
the losses complained of."
Several trafficking violations in the corporation's supply chain
could be sufficient to prove the directors had knowledge of a failure to
comply with the TVPRA, but these arguments may depend on
additional facts. 229 As awareness of supply-chain trafficking grows,
however, directors may find it more difficult to defend against
shareholders' claims that they should have known trafficking was
230
occurring.
If directors know that the corporation is benefitting financially
from a supplier's trafficking violations and take no action, the directors
breach their fiduciary duty to make a good-faith attempt to stop the
violations. 2 31 Director liability for failure to monitor requires "(a) [that]
the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information

Rales v. Blasbandtest, respectively. Jara, supra note 222, at 210. "To show (1) bad faith for the
Caremark violation and (2) substantial likelihood of liability for demand futility, plaintiffs must
allege the directors knew they were violating a duty." Jara, supra note 222, at 213.
227. See Jara, supra note 222, at 218-19:
[T]he shareholder claim under Caremark must "contend[ ] that the directors set in
motion or 'allowed a situation to develop and continue which exposed the corporation to
enormous legal liability and that in doing so they violated a duty to be active monitors
of corporate performance.' " . . . If plaintiffs can show that directors failed to monitor
and that directors knew they were violating a fiduciary duty by "conscious[ly]
disregard[ing] their responsibilities," they are more likely to demonstrate a failure of
oversight and a substantial likelihood of liability under the demand-futility analysis for
director interest.
(alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott,
46 A.3d 313, 340 (Del. Ch. 2012) and Stone, 911 A.2d at 370).
228. 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). Under a different theory of liability, if a defendant
corporation has actually engaged in labor trafficking, the basis for this derivative suit may be the
corporation's realization of illegal profits. See McLaughlin, supra note 221 (realization of illegal
profits is a classic breach of fiduciary duty).
229. See Jara, supra note 222, at 221-24 (comparing the different results in In re Abbott
LaboratoriesDerivative ShareholdersLitigation and Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v.
Deaton, both of which involved directors being on notice of repetitive corporate violations).
230. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (noting it is more difficult to claim ignorance
of trafficking violations today than it was in the past).
231. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (requiring plaintiffs prove that directors lacked a good
faith effort to "prevent or remedy" a violation of law as an element of breach of duty).
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systems or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or
controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus
disabling themselves from being informed." 23 2 If directors have no
monitoring or oversight mechanisms in place to prevent the corporation
from recklessly disregarding a financial benefit from trafficking, they
fail their duty to act in the best interests of the corporation to maximize
shareholder value by exposing the corporation to high litigation costs
under the criminal and civil provisions of the TVPRA and to potential
233
reputational harm.
In Stone v.Ritter, the court clarified that a failure to act in good
faith is not alone sufficient for director liability, but it is "essential to
establish director oversight liability."234 The business judgment rule
cannot protect actions that are not made in good faith. 235 Bad faith
actions include a failure to adequately monitor the actions of the
corporation. 236 Given the prevalence of supply-chain trafficking and the
potential liability under the TVPRA for corporations that financially
benefit from trafficking, directors' disregard of trafficking indicators
and failure to remedy any problems discovered could demonstrate
23 7
failure to act in good faith.
The final element of the Caremark test to show directors
breached their duty requires shareholders to prove that the knowing or
reckless disregard of violations of law and failure to "prevent or remedy
that situation" proximately caused loss. 238 With regard to human
trafficking, a failure to monitor the labor practices of suppliers could
232. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
233. See generally CorporateLiability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining
there is a connection between legal liability for supply-chain trafficking and harm to reputation
and shareholders).
234. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
235. Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int'l v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 977 (2013) ("[T]he business
judgment rule does not apply if directors fail to inform themselves of all material information
reasonably available to them and fail to act with requisite care."); Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967-68
("[T]he business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep respect for all good faith
board decisions.") (emphasis added); OKELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 59, at 222-23.
236. Jara, supra note 222, at 215 ("The liability for breach, however, only arises when the
director acted in bad faith by consciously or knowingly failing to fulfill the duty concerning
compliance and monitoring.").
237. See Kerr, supranote 68, at 834-39 ("Purposely refusing to consider the social effects of a
business decision could be considered a dereliction of duty and therefore a breach of good
faith ....
").As an example of supply-chain prevalence, in 2011, an estimated fifty-three percent
of American manufacturing companies employed foreign workers in product creation. Bang, supra
note 2, at 270 (citing Job Outsourcing Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (July 20, 2012),
http://www.statisticbrain.com/outsourcing-statistics.by-country/ [http://perma.cc/H6J8-VQWS].
238. 698 A.2d at 971. At least one court has explained that the fiduciary duty of care described
in Caremark is really a fiduciary duty of loyalty, but this Note will not address this distinction
between duties of care and duties of loyalty. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.

538

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2:499

negatively impact the corporation, resulting in financial loss, if costly
239
litigation or reputational damage results.
Several cases that plaintiffs filed against corporations with
human trafficking or other human rights violations have resulted in
large settlement fees or judgments. 240 For example, in 2006 a judge
ruled that an oil-industry parts manufacturer must pay $1.24 million
241
to fifty-two victims of human trafficking under a civil rights theory.
In a corporate human rights case, though not a human trafficking case,
Shell settled with plaintiffs for $15.5 million. 242 As previously noted,
Signal International, LLC, faced a $12 million judgment for trafficking
violations and later settled with other workers in July 2015 for $20
million before filing bankruptcy. 243 Similarly large judgments could
result from increased use of the TVPRA, particularly as activists are
encouraging increased use of litigation against human trafficking
violations. 2 44 With the addition of the financial benefit provision to the
TVPRA in 2008, the status quo of general apathy towards supply-chain
practices should no longer be an acceptable, good-faith business
decision.
At least one commentator has criticized the financial benefit
provision of the 2008 TVPRA for not going far enough to create civil
liability for corporate action and for creating a moral hazard for
corporations. 245 This criticism comes from a concern that corporations
239. See OLUFEMI AMAO, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LAW
69 (2011) (theorizing that good corporate social responsibility should positively impact a
corporation but also recognizing that the impact is difficult to quantify); Johnson, supra note 53,
at 33-35 (describing risks of engaging in trafficking); Prelogar et al., supra note 218 ("Companies
associated with human trafficking not only face serious legal and enforcement risks, but also risk
severely tarnishing their brands in the eyes of consumers, investors, employees, and other
stakeholders." (footnote omitted)). Litigation may have a greater impact on the corporation's
finances than consumer reaction, depending on multiple factors. JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 7 &
n.53 (explaining the relationship between stock price and reputation is unclear but that adverse
judgments can affect stock price); see also Bang, supra note 2, at 270-71 (explaining that after an
initial negative public reaction to working conditions at Nike and Disney, little occurred).
240. See Pierce, supra note 51, at 584 n.73 (describing damages of $1.24 million against
traffickers); JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 14-15 (noting corporate civil damages can harm a
corporation's bottom line and share price).
241. Press Release, U.S. Equal Opportunity Emp't Comm'n, supra note 63.
242. Ed Pilkington, Shell Pays Out $15.5m Over Saro-Wiwa Killing, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2009,
7:07 P.M.), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/un/08/nigeria-usa [perma.ccK7WL-ZNZT].
243. Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 7; Finn, supra note 31 (explaining Signal International
was required to pay $12 million of the $14 million verdict).
244. Vandenberg, supranote 17, at 2; CorporateLiability and Human Trafficking, supra note
1, at 1.
245. See Pierce, supra note 51, at 594-96 (arguing the TVPRA still does not create adequate
liability for corporations culpable for human trafficking violations). Pierce calls the financial
benefit provision a "step in the right direction" and yet "still not sufficient" because it cannot reach
corporations that willfully ignore trafficking violations in the supply chain. Id. at 594. Compare
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that are willfully blind to trafficking violations will remain immune
from liability. 246 Commentators have expressed concern that
corporations will purposefully remain oblivious to supply-chain labor
practices so they can plead ignorance if a claim is brought. 247 The
TVPRA does not criminalize or create liability for entities that are
negligent of trafficking in the supply chain, only those that "knew or
should have known" of the harmful, forceful, abusive, or manipulative
conditions in which labor was obtained. 248 Courts' interpretations of the
facts sufficient to establish whether a corporation "should have known"
of trafficking will greatly influence the incentive structure created by
249
the TVPRA.
However, the risk of a potential shareholder suit should alter the
incentive structure for corporations to deter temptation to remain
ignorant of supply-chain practices. Although proving that directors
knew their failure to monitor was a violation of a fiduciary duty may be
difficult, 250 even the fact that shareholders file a derivative suit may
cause a deterrent effect or spur directors to implement greater
monitoring and reporting oversight. 25 1 This additional litigation risk
should alter the incentive structure to reject any desire to be
intentionally oblivious to potential trafficking and instead require that
a corporation actively determine that it complies with the TVPRA.
Rational disinterest of shareholders, though an issue in
corporate governance at large, will not prevent the use of the
25 2
shareholder derivative suit as a tool of corporate accountability.
Human rights activists may encourage shareholders to bring these suits

Dryhurst, supra note 102, at 654-55 ("Theory predicts that corporations will structure their
employment relationships to avoid liability by hiring thinly capitalized agents and avoiding direct
control of those agents."), with George & Smith, supra note 64, at 92 ("[Bjusinesses can no longer
turn a blind eye to the problem of child sex trafficking, because they run the risk of being held
liable for their part in the problem simply because they should have known it was occurring.").
246. See Dryhurst, supranote 102, at 662-63 (questioning the incentives the TVPRA creates).
247. See Pierce, supra note 51, at 594-96 (critiquing the financial benefit language for being
insufficient to remedy the problem of corporate trafficking violations); Dryhurst, supra note 102,
at 654-55 (describing concerns about corporate agency).
248. 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2012); supra Section III.C.
249. See Dryhurst, supra note 102, at 662-63 ("The question remains whether the TVPA
standard provides adequate incentives for the employer corporation to structure those
relationships [between employer corporations and independent contractors] so as to reduce the
probability of labor trafficking violations.").
250. See In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining that a claim of
director failure to monitor "is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a
plaintiff might hope to win a judgment").
251. Jara, supra note 222, at 216, 236-42.
252. See Morrissey, supranote 62, at 372 (describing "rational apathy" of shareholders).
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or may become shareholders themselves in order to bring this
253
derivative litigation.
C. Appropriate CorporateMonitoring
Corporations must take steps to assess, monitor, and report
risks of human trafficking violations in their supply chains. 25 4 The
disclosure requirements of the California Transparency in Supply
Chains Act describe a good baseline of corporate best practices:
corporations should verify product supply chains for indications of
trafficking violations, audit suppliers for labor practices, require
certification that materials were made free from trafficking violations,
develop and maintain internal governance standards, and provide
employee training on trafficking awareness. 255 There are three
affirmative steps a corporation should take to fulfill its obligations to
shareholders to minimize risks of human trafficking violations and the
impact violations may have on the corporation: (1) implementing
monitoring systems, (2) developing a human trafficking resolution or
committee prepared to take enforcement action when aware of
violations, and (3) giving adequate disclosure of risks.
The most important step for corporate boards to take is to adopt
appropriate monitoring systems to help a corporation minimize risk of
trafficking violations by keeping the board and key officers informed
about labor practices used in its supply chain. 256 Because directors may
be liable where there is "an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists,"25 7 directors must,
at the very least, have reporting systems in place to be informed about
potential trafficking violations. The Delaware Supreme Court has

253. Vandenberg, supra note 17, at 12 (encouraging creative lawyering techniques and the
general pursuit of increased strategic litigation to fight trafficking crimes).
254. See Prelogar et al., supra note 218 ("Risk assessments are an important step in
understanding the trafficking-related risks that exist in a company's industry, particular
operations, and supply chain.").
255. See Erika R. George, Influencing the Impact of Business on Human Rights, in CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS, supra note 71, at 253, 276-79 (describing the

California Transparency in Supply Chains Act); Todres, supra note 168, at 96-97 (same). These
requirements are very similar to the Department of Labor's "eight steps to an effective social
compliance system." Bureau of Int'l Lab. Affairs, Reducing Child Labor and Forced Labor: A
Toolkit for Responsible Business, U.S. DEP'T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ilab/child-forcedlabor/index.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) [perma.cc/C8XL-UHMU].
256. See, e.g., Williams & Conley, supra note 69, at 88 (explaining companies need adequate
reporting mechanisms with regard to human rights violations). There is also a least-cost avoider
argument that corporations should monitor supply chains because they are in the position to do so
most effectively and cheaply. See Todres, supra note 168, at 86.
257. In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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approved of monitoring systems where corporate officers were required
2 58
to approve of contracts, where an internal audit system was in place,
where the board had a compliance program, where there were written
policies and procedures for compliance, and where a corporate
department had responsibility "for the detection and reporting of
suspicious activity." 259 In contrast, a company with "no internal controls
in place," a company that had internal controls but did not monitor
them, or a company that ignored "red flags" would not meet the
260
standards required for good faith.
Corporate boards should implement proper reporting systems to
avoid corporate liability for failure to monitor supply-chain human
trafficking effectively. Hypothetically, if benefitting from exceptionally
low labor costs is sufficient to demonstrate reckless disregard of
potential trafficking violations, 261 corporations should carefully monitor
contracts with independent contractors for evidence of any indication of
trafficking. 26 2 As previously addressed, adequate monitoring of supplychain labor practices is also part of the board's fulfillment of its
fiduciary duties. 263 While the system of monitoring will vary based on
each corporation's structure and business practices, corporations will
need to add corporate oversight in order to comply with the TVPRA.
Acting in accordance with good human rights practices may also
require corporations to develop codes of conduct, resolutions, and
enforcement plans that prioritize monitoring and eliminating human
trafficking from the corporate supply chain. 264 Although resolutions or
258. Id. at 963.
259. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 371-74 (Del. 2006) ("[T]he Board received and approved
relevant policies and procedures, delegated to certain employees and departments the
responsibility for filing [Suspicious Activity Reports] and monitoring compliance, and exercised
oversight by relying on periodic reports from them.").
260. See Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int'l v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 982-84 (2013).
261. See Dryhurst, supra note 102, at 662 ("[T]he terms of the labor contractor agreement can
provide evidence that the employer corporation has obtained such favorable terms that the
contractor would not agree to them in the absence of extortionate activity."); supranotes 181-182
and accompanying text.
262. See Prelogar et al., supra note 218 ("[C]ompanies should endeavor to conduct due
diligence on third parties presenting potential risks throughout all levels of their supply
chains.... Companies may achieve efficiencies by building anti-trafficking and other human
rights-related vetting of third parties into their regular anticorruption due diligence and
international regulatory screening procedures.").
263. Supra Section IV.B.1.
264. MATTAR, supra note 91, at 9, 15; Robert N. Leavell, Corporate Social-Reform, The
Business Judgment Rule and Other Considerations,20 GA. L. REV. 565, 604-05 (1986) (explaining
that corporate boards take action by passing resolutions); Daniel Thiirer, Soft Law, in IX MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 269, 271 (Rildiger Wolfrum ed., 2012)
("While codes of conduct may or may not be legally binding, it is a specific feature of soft law that
is distinct from legally binding norms.").
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codes of conduct do not, alone, reduce the risk of potential TVPRA
violations, they are a public demonstration to corporate suppliers, the
corporation's shareholders, and the general public that the corporation
is aware of the need to be concerned with trafficking violations and is
26 5
prepared to monitor and confront those risks if necessary.
Resolutions do not have to detail precisely how the monitoring
should occur, as corporate managers may be in a better position to
determine the best manner to carry out the day-to-day operations of
monitoring. 2 66 Directors should consider the recommendations of the
U.S. State Department in crafting an anti-trafficking policy:
Among other things, an effective policy: prohibits human trafficking and those activities
that facilitate it including charging workers recruitment fees, contract fraud, and
document retention; responds to industry- or region-specific risks; requires freedom of
movement for workers; pays all employees at least the minimum wage in all countries of
operation, preferably a living wage; includes a grievance mechanism and whistleblower
protections; and applies to direct employees, as well as subcontractors, labor recruiters,
267
and other business partners.

Individual corporations will have to determine how best to incorporate
these recommendations, as they may vary based on the industry and
the board's perception of the actual or perceived risk of corporate and
suppliers' violations.
Additionally, resolutions should include a plan to train employees
about common indicators of human trafficking so employees are better
equipped to recognize signs should they be confronted with the
possibility of a human trafficking violation. 268 A resolution or code of
conduct should also include some methods of enforcement 269-which
may, in the most drastic circumstances, require a corporation to end the
business relationship with one supplier altogether and report that
supplier to the authorities.
Finally, corporations should disclose the efforts they are taking
270
to minimize risk of human trafficking violations in the supply chain.

265. See JOSEPH, supra note 63, at 8 (explaining codes of conduct may have public relations
impacts and noting the need for additional action to make codes of conduct effective).
266. See Leavell, supra note 264, at 605.
267. TIP Report 2015, supra note 23, at 32.
268. See id.
269. See id. (describing the private sector's role in combating human trafficking); JOSEPH,
supra note 63, at 8 (explaining that corporate codes of conduct are inadequate without "vigorous
enforcement").
270. Furthermore, corporations must already provide information on how "their commercial
activities can be associated with either conflict or corruption" under Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. George, supra note 255, at 257. An analysis of how the
TVPRA expands corporate disclosure requirements under securities law is beyond the scope of this
Note. There is currently not a federal law specifically requiring this disclosure. The Business
Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act, which failed in subcommittee, would have impacted
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California legislation already requires legally mandated disclosure of
anti-trafficking policies for certain businesses. 2 71 Directors who
encourage their corporation to proactively adopt this disclosure will be
prepared if disclosure requirements expand to additional states or
272
become federal requirements.
CONCLUSION

The initial flurry of ATS litigation encouraged human rights
activists to pursue corporate accountability through litigation. Since
the Kiobel Court limited the extraterritorial applicability of the ATS,
these activists may look to the TVPRA as a tool to litigate for corporate
accountability. 273 The current legal environment demonstrates a
greater focus on combating trafficking. 274 Corporations must be aware
of the potential use of the TVPRA and should adopt business practices
that will safeguard them from liability should a suit arise. Corporations
should be aware of the risk that negative publicity stemming from
accusations of human rights violations, whether or not a suit is filed,
may have on shareholder value.
corporations with trafficking in the supply chain: "Under the proposal, issuers would have been
required to include in their annual reports to the SEC a disclosure describing measures, if any,
the company had taken to identify and address conditions of forced labor, slavery, human
trafficking, and the worst forms of child labor within its supply chains." Id. at 273. For a suggestion
that federal securities laws may require disclosure of human trafficking information, see Corporate
Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 13-14.
271. See George, supra note 255, at 276-79 (describing the California Transparency in Supply
Chains Act).
272. In the United Kingdom, the Modern Slavery Act of 2015 now mandates business with a
certain amount of sales to disclose efforts made to reduce trafficking violations in their supply
chain. TIP Report 2015, supra note 23, at 24. The Business Supply Chain Transparency on
Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2015, which once failed in subcommittee but has been reintroduced,
would expand companies' disclosure obligations. George, supra note 255, at 273; Corporate
Liability and Human Trafficking, supra note 1, at 14.
273. Stephens, supra note 71, at 199.
274. Congress recently passed the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, and the proposal of
the End Modern Slavery Initiative Act has enthusiastic, bipartisan support. Erica Werner, Senate
Unanimously Passes Human Trafficking Bill, Setting Up Vote on Attorney General, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Apr. 22, 2015, 5:21 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/
2015/04/22/anti-human-trafficking-bill-expected-to-pass-senate
[http://perma.cc/3M59-HDQ7].
The bill, proposed by Sen. Bob Corker and introduced Feb. 24, 2015, would raise $1.5 billion to
support a grant-making foundation to fund efforts to combat modern slavery and trafficking. End
Modern Slavery Initiative Act, CORKER. SENATE.GOv, http://www.corker.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/end-modern-slavery-initiative-act (last visited Oct. 12, 2015) [http://perma.cc/ZT4R9UK2]. On July 10, 2015, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved funding for the bill.
Corker Applauds Funding for the End Modern Slavery Initiative in FY2016 State, Foreign
Operations
Appropriations
Bill,
THE
CHATTANOOGAN
(July
10,
2015),
http://www.chattanoogan.com/2015/7/10/303946/Corker-Applauds-Funding-For-The-End.aspx
[http://perma.cc/6X6N-DNQQ].
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If concern about litigation under the TVPRA creates insufficient
incentives for a corporation to monitor its supply chain, the risk of
litigation with shareholders should create even higher incentives to
eliminate human trafficking. This risk of derivative suits heightens
corporate responsibility to not only comply with the TVPRA to abstain
from recklessly disregarding or knowingly benefitting from human
trafficking but to also take affirmative steps to monitor the supply chain
for violations of trafficking laws. With the financial benefit provisions
of the TVPRA, corporate directors' failure to monitor supply chains for
indicators of human trafficking and failure to eliminate trafficking or
terminate relationships with suppliers where it does exist are no longer
acceptable business decisions.
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